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Abstract—This paper aims to go beyond resilience into the
study of security and local-repairability for distributed storage
systems (DSS). Security and local-repairability are both impor-
tant as features of an efficient storage system, and this paper
aims to understand the trade-offs between resilience, security, and
local-repairability in these systems. In particular, this paper first
investigates security in the presence of colluding eavesdroppers,
where eavesdroppers are assumed to work together in decoding
stored information. Second, the paper focuses on coding schemes
that enable optimal local repairs. It further brings these two
concepts together, to develop locally repairable coding schemes
for DSS that are secure against eavesdroppers.
The main results of this paper include: a. An improved bound
on the secrecy capacity for minimum storage regenerating codes,
b. secure coding schemes that achieve the bound for some special
cases, c. a new bound on minimum distance for locally repairable
codes, d. code construction for locally repairable codes that attain
the minimum distance bound, and e. repair-bandwidth-efficient
locally repairable codes with and without security constraints.
Index Terms—Coding for distributed storage systems, locally
repairable codes, repair bandwidth efficient codes, security.
I. INTRODUCTION
A. Background
Distributed storage systems (DSS) are of increasingly im-
portance, given the vast amounts of data being generated
and accessed worldwide. OceanStore [1], Google File Sys-
tem (GFS) [2] and TotalRecall [3] are a few examples of
existing DSS. An essential component of DSS is resilience
to node failures, which is why every DSS today incorporates
a mechanism for protection against failures, thus preventing
permanent loss of data stored on the system. Typically, this
resilience is afforded by replication, and in recent years, using
more sophisticated coding theoretic techniques.
Node failures are one of the many design challenges faced
by DSS. There are two other challenges, arguably of equal
importance: 1) security and 2) local-repairability. Due to the
decentralized nature of such systems, it is important whether
they are secure against a variety of possible attacks. Our
focus in this paper is on passive eavesdroppers located at
multiple nodes in the DSS that can collude in attempting to
gain an understanding of the stored data. In addition to being
decentralized, DSS systems are often widely geographically
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distributed; therefore, local-repairability in storage proves very
useful. In this paper, we develop a deeper understanding
of local-repairability in storage, and subsequently combine
locality and security to develop codes for secure locally-
repairable DSS.
The security of communication or storage systems can be
analyzed with their resilience to active or passive attacks [4],
[5]. Active attacks in such systems include settings were an
adversary modifies existing packets or injects new ones into
the system, whereas the passive attack models include eaves-
droppers observing the messages being stored/transmitted. For
DSS, cryptographic approaches are often ineffective, as key
distribution and management between all nodes in the system
is extremely challenging to accomplish. A coding/information
theoretic approach to security typically offers stronger security
guarantees than cryptographic schemes [6], [7]. Moreover,
in the context of distributed storage, such approach is lo-
gistically easier to realize than mechanisms that require key
management. A secrecy-enabling coding scheme is designed
based on a worst-case estimate of the information leaked to
eavesdroppers, and can naturally complement other existing
coding schemes being utilized in distributed storage systems.
In its simplest form, security against an eavesdropper can
be achieved using a one-time pad scheme [8]. For example,
consider that the contents of the two nodes are given by
X1 = R, and X2 = R⊕D, where R is a uniformly random bit,
and D is the data bit. By contacting both nodes, one can clearly
obtain the data by computing X1⊕X2. However, one can not
get any information about the data bit by observing any one
of the two nodes as the mutual information between the data
and the content of one of the nodes is zero, i.e., I(Xi;D) = 0
for i = 1, 2. This example corroborates the significance of
information theoretic approach in securing DSS.
Local-repairability of DSS is an additional property which
can be one of the primary design criteria for the system. The
corresponding performance metric associated with a coding
scheme is its locality r which is defined as the number of nodes
that must participate in a repair process when a particular node
fails. Local-repairability requires small locality, which implies
that fewer nodes are involved in the node repair process.
This makes the entire repair process easier from a logistical
perspective. In addition, local-repairability is of significant
interest when a cost is associated with contacting each node
in the system. Local-repairability, in its simplest form, can
be accomplished by splitting the data into groups, and then
separately coding and storing each group. However, this naı¨ve
approach requires the connection to all the groups in order to
retrieve the whole data, and may not be the most efficient in
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2terms of other metrics of interest, e.g., resilience. Therefore,
there is a growing interest in more sophisticated mechanisms
for achieving local-repairability in DSS. The systems designed
with locality in mind can also present benefits in terms of
security. In other words, local-repairability and security against
eavesdropper attack go hand in hand, and, as we illustrate in
this paper, a joint design of both features can prove to be
particularly useful.
In DSS, encoding data before storing it on the system
provides the same level of resilience against node failures
as that of the conventional approach of uncoded replication,
but with much less storage space. The advantages that can be
leveraged in terms of storage space may result in a degradation
of other performance metrics. Being one of such metrics,
repair bandwidth refers to the amount of data that needs to
be transferred in the event of a single node failure in order to
regenerate the data on the failed node. This metric is highly
relevant as a large fraction of network bandwidth in DSS can
be occupied by the data being transferred during the repair
process. Thus, it is desirable to have coding schemes with
small repair bandwidth. Most of the codes designed for storage
in the past are maximum distance separable (MDS) codes [9]–
[11]. These codes usually entail a high repair bandwidth as the
entire original file is reconstructed in order to regenerate the
encoded data stored at a particular storage node. The DSS
employing MDS codes have ‘any k out of n’ property, where
the content of any k storage nodes out of n nodes in the system
is sufficient to recover the original file.
In [12], Dimakis et al. address the issue of repair bandwidth
and establish a trade-off between per node storage α and
repair bandwidth γ for codes that have desirable ‘any k out
of n’ property1. The class of codes that attain this trade-
off is referred to as regenerating codes. Utilizing network
coding framework, [12] considers the notion of functional
repair where node repair process may not exactly replicate the
original failed node; nonetheless, the repaired node preserves
‘any k out of n’ property of the overall storage system.
However, it is desirable to perform exact repair in DSS,
where the data regenerated after the repair process is an
exact replica of what was stored on the failed node. This is
essential due to the ease of maintenance and other practical
advantages, e.g., maintaining a code in its systematic form.
Exact repair is also advantageous compared to the functional
repair in the presence of eavesdroppers, as the latter scheme
requires updating the coding rules which may leak additional
information to eavesdroppers [13]. Noting the resilience of
exact repair to eavesdropping attacks and the necessity of it
for practical purposes, it is of significant interest to design
regenerating codes that not only enjoy an optimal trade-off in
repair bandwidth vs. storage, but also satisfy exact repair in
addition to security and/or small locality constraints.
B. Contributions and organization
In this paper, we consider secure minimum storage regener-
ating codes, and locally repairable codes for DSS with/without
1These codes are not necessarily MDS codes. For MDS codes, we have
the file size M = kα, in addition to ‘any k out of n’ property.
security constraints. As a security constraint, we adopt the
passive and colluding eavesdropper model presented in [14].
Under this model, during the entire life span of the DSS, the
eavesdropper can get access to data stored on an `1 number of
nodes, and, in addition, it observes both the stored content and
the data downloaded (for repair) on an additional `2 number of
nodes. This attack model generalizes the eavesdropper model
proposed in [13], which considers the case of `2 = 0. Since
the amount of information downloaded during a node repair
is equal to the information stored on the repaired node for
minimum bandwidth regenerating codes, the two notions are
different only for the minimum storage regenerating codes.
With this general eavesdropper model, we extend the ex-
isting results on the design of secure minimum storage re-
generating codes for DSS in Section III. First, we derive an
upper bound on secrecy capacity, the amount of data that
can be stored on the system without leaking information to
an eavesdropper, for a DSS employing bandwidth efficient
node repair. Our bound is novel in that it can take into
account the additional downloaded data at the eavesdroppers;
as a result, it is tighter than the available bounds in the
literature [13]. In Section III-B, we present a secure, exact-
repairable coding scheme that has a higher code rate compared
to that of the scheme presented in [14]. Utilizing a special
case of the obtained bound, we show our coding scheme
achieves the bound on secrecy capacity for any (`1, `2) when
the eavesdropper observes node repairs of a set of `1 + `2
(< k) nodes for any `2 ≤ 2.
In Section IV, we consider locally repairable DSS where
an original file is encoded using a code with (small) locality
before storing it on the system. In particular, we focus on
vector codes with all symbol locality which we refer to as
vector locally repairable codes. Similar to scalar codes with
locality considered in [15], we allow for these codes to have
multiple local parities per local group. In Section IV-A, we
derive an upper bound on minimum distance of vector locally
repairable codes. The bound is quite general and applies to
non-linear codes as well. We develop this bound using the
proof technique used in [16], [17]. Subsequently, we present a
novel explicit construction for vector locally repairable codes,
based on Gabidulin codes, a family of maximum rank distance
(MRD) codes. We show that these codes are optimal in
the sense that they achieve the derived bound on minimum
distance. Remarkably, this establishes a per node storage vs.
resilience trade-off for vector locally repairable codes with
multiple local parities per local group, similar to the work of
Papailiopoulos et al [17], which considers vector locally re-
pairable codes with a single local parity per local group. Here,
as a special case of our general construction for vector locally
repairable codes, we also describe an explicit construction for
scalar code with the all symbol locality property for the range
of parameters where only existential results are present in the
literature [15], [16].
In Section V, we introduce the notion of repair bandwidth
efficiency for locally repairable DSS. We obtain an upper
bound on the file size for locally repairable codes that allow
node repairs to be performed with a given repair bandwidth.
We then present minimum distance optimal locally repairable
3coding schemes that are repair bandwidth efficient and achieve
the file size bound2. We combine locally repairable codes with
minimum storage regenerating codes to obtain such schemes.
Finally, we consider the problem of providing security
against passive eavesdropping attacks for locally repairable
codes in Section VI. We derive an upper bound on the size of
data that can be stored on a minimum distance optimal locally
repairable DSS that is secure against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper.
We consider two cases: (i) single parity node per local group
in Section VI-A and (ii) multiple parity nodes per local group
in Section VI-B. We present secure locally repairable coding
schemes for DSS in both cases using secrecy pre-coding. We
also highlight the advantages of having multiple local parity
nodes per local group when security constraints are present.
In all the scenarios that we study in this paper, the achiev-
ability results allow for exact repair, and we obtain secure
file size upper bounds from min-cut analyses over the secrecy
graph representation of DSS. Our main secrecy achievability
coding argument is obtained by utilizing a secret sharing
scheme with MRD codes (based on linearized polynomials),
similar to the classical work of [19]. In the following subsec-
tion, we present a summary of related work to the problems
studied in this paper. In Section II, we provide a general
system model together with necessary background material.
We also present some preliminary results in Section II which
are utilized throughout the paper.
C. Related work
In [12], Dimakis et al. characterize the information theoretic
trade-off between repair bandwidth and per node storage for
DSS satisfying the ‘any k out of n’ property. The authors
map the life span of DSS with a given set of node failures
to a multicast problem over a dynamic network. Using this
mapping, the authors show that network coding based stor-
age schemes achieve the lower bound on repair bandwidth
allowing functional repair [12]. [20] and [21] present coding
schemes that achieve the lower bound on repair bandwidth.
The work in [22]–[24] devise codes that achieve the lower
bound derived in [12] when data is downloaded from all
surviving nodes in order to perform exact repair of a failed
node. The coding schemes in [22] and [23], [24] are tailored
for k < 3 and k ≤ n2 , respectively. In [25], Rashmi et al.
design exact-repairable codes, which allow node repair to be
performed by contacting d ≤ n − 1 surviving nodes. These
codes are optimal for all parameters (n, k, d) at the minimum
bandwidth regeneration (MBR) point of the storage-bandwidth
trade-off. At the minimum storage regeneration (MSR) point,
these codes belong to low rate regime, as their rate is upper
bounded by 12 +
1
2n . Recently, researchers have devised high
rate exact-repairable codes for the MSR point. [26] presents
codes for DSS with two parity nodes, which accomplish exact
regeneration while being optimal in repair bandwidth. In [27]
and [28], permutation-matrix based codes are designed to
2In a parallel and independent work [18], Kamath et al. also provide upper
bounds on minimum distance together with constructions and existence results
for vector locally repairable codes. [18] studies repair bandwidth efficient
locally repairable codes as well.
achieve the bound on repair bandwidth for systematic node
repair for all (n, k) pairs. [29] further generalizes the idea of
[28] to get MDS array codes for DSS that allow optimal exact
regeneration for parity nodes as well.
Towards obtaining coding schemes with small locality,
Oggier et al. present coding schemes which facilitate local
node repair in [30], [31]. In [16], Gopalan et al. establish an
upper bound on the minimum distance of locally repairable
linear scalar codes, which is analogous to the Singleton bound.
They also show that Pyramid codes proposed in [32] achieve
this bound. Subsequently, the work by Prakash et al. extends
the bound to a more general definition of locally repairable
scalar linear codes [15] with multiple local parities per a local
group. In [17], Papailiopoulos et al. generalize the bound in
[16] to vector codes (potentially non-linear) having one local
parity in each local group, and establish per node storage vs.
resilience trade-off. They also present locally repairable coding
schemes that exhibit ‘k out of n’ property at the cost of small
amount of excess storage space per node.
The problem of designing secure DSS against eavesdrop-
ping attack has been addressed in [13]. In [13], Pawar et
al. consider an eavesdropper which can get access to the
data stored on ` (< k) storage nodes of DSS operating
at the MBR point. The authors derive an upper bound on
the secrecy capacity of such systems, and present a coding
scheme in the “bandwidth limited regime” that achieve this
bound. Shah et al. consider the design of secure regenerating
codes at the MSR point as well [14]. Since the amount
of data downloaded for node repair at the MSR point is
more than what is eventually stored on the repaired node,
the eavesdropper may obtain more information if it is able
to access the data downloaded during node repair process.
Therefore, at the MSR point, the eavesdropper is modeled as
accessing the data stored on `1 nodes and data downloaded
during `2 node repairs (corresponding to distinct nodes), with
`1 + `2 < k. In [14], Shah et al. present a coding scheme,
based on product matrix codes [25], that achieves the bound
on secrecy capacity derived in [13]. They further use product
matrix codes based solution for the MSR point as well, which
matches the bound in [13] only when `2 = 0. Thus, the secrecy
capacity for MSR codes is considered to be open when the
eavesdropper is allowed to observe downloaded information
during node repairs. Moreover, the solution at the MSR point
in [14] gives only low rate schemes as product matrix codes
are themselves low rate codes.
There is a closely related line of work on analyzing DSS in
the presence of active attacks where an adversary is allowed
to modify the content stored on a certain number of nodes
throughout the life span of the DSS. Under active attacks, the
objective of designing coding schemes to allow for successful
decoding of the original data at a data collector, even in the
presence of erroneous data injected by the active adversary, is
studied in [13], [33], [34].
II. SYSTEM MODEL AND PRELIMINARIES
We consider a DSS with n live nodes at a time. Let f denote
a file of size M over a finite field F that needs to be stored
4on the DSS. Each node in the system is assumed to store α
symbols over F. In what follows, we refer to α as a node size.
In order to store the file f = (f1, f2, . . . , fM) ∈ FM on the
DSS, it is first encoded to n blocks, x = (x1,x2, . . . ,xn) ∈
(Fα)n, each α symbol long over F. The vector x of length nα
over F can be considered as a codeword of a vector code3 C.
The size of a finite field F is specified later in the context of
various code constructions presented in this paper. Given the
codeword x, node i in an n-node DSS stores encoded block
xi. In this paper, we use xi to represent both block xi and a
storage node storing this encoded block.
Given this setup, the network evolves over failures and
repairs. In the event of failure of i-th storage node, a new
node, namely the newcomer, is introduced to the system. This
node contacts to d surviving storage nodes and downloads β
symbols from each of these nodes, which translates to repair
bandwidth γ = dβ. The newcomer node uses these dβ number
of downloaded symbols to regenerate α symbols xi and stores
these symbols. This exact repair process is assumed to preserve
‘any k out of n’ property of the DSS, i.e., data stored on
any k nodes (potentially including the nodes that are repaired)
allows the original file f to be reconstructed. In the sequel,
we use (n,k)-DSS to refer to the systems with ‘any k out of
n’ property.
During the node repair process, the symbols transmitted
from node i in order to repair node j are denoted as di,j , and
the set dj is used to denote all of the symbols downloaded at
node j. For linear encoding schemes, we use Di,j to denote
the subspace spanned by the symbols di,j . Dj then represent
the subspace downloaded to node j, which have a certain
dimension in this subspace representation. For a given set of
nodes A, we use the notation xA , {si, i ∈ A}. A similar
notation is adopted for the downloaded symbols, and the
subspace representation. Throughout the text, we usually stick
to the notation of having vectors denoted by lower-case bold
letters; and, sets and subspaces being denoted with calligraphic
fonts. [n] denotes the set {1, 2, . . . , n}. We use a | b (a - b)
to represent that a divides b (a does not divide b). Next, we
present a formal description of vector codes.
A. Vector codes
An (n,M, dmin, α)q vector code C ⊆ (Fαq )n is a collection
of M vectors of length nα over Fq . A codeword c ∈ C consists
of n blocks, each of size α over Fq . We can replace each α-
long block with an element in Fqα to obtain a vector c =
(c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ Fnqα . The minimum distance dmin of C is
defined as the minimum Hamming distance between any two
codewords in C, when codewords are viewed as vectors in
Fnqα , i.e.,
dmin = min
c,c˜∈C:c6=c˜
dH(c, c˜). (1)
Here, dH(a,b) =
∑n
i=1 1{ai 6=bi} denotes the Hamming
distance between vectors a and b in Fnqα with 1{ai 6=bi}
representing indicator function, which takes value 1 if ai 6= bi
3Vector codes are formally defined in Section II-A.
and zero otherwise. An alternative definition for the minimum
distance of an (n,M, dmin, α)q vector code is as follows [17]:
Definition 1. Let c be a codeword in C selected uniformly
at random from M codewords. The minimum distance of C is
defined as
dmin = n− maxA⊆[n]:H(cA)<M |A|, (2)
where A = {i1, . . . , i|A|} ⊆ [n], cA = (ci1 , . . . , ci|A|), and
H(·) denotes q-entropy.
A vector code is said to be maximum distance separable
(MDS) code if α| logqM and dmin = n − logqMα + 1.
Vector codes are also known as array codes [10], [11].
A linear (n,M, dmin, α)q vector (array) code is a linear
subspace of Fαnq of dimension M = logqM . We use
[n,M, dmin, α]q to denote a linear (n,M, dmin, α)q array
code. An [n,M, dmin, α]q array code is called MDS array
code if α|M and dmin = n− Mα + 1. Constructions for MDS
array codes can be found e.g. in [9]–[11].
The encoding process of an (n,M = qM, dmin, α)q vector
code can be summarized by a function
G : FMq →
(
Fαq
)n
. (3)
In general, G can be an arbitrary function. However, for
an [n,M, dmin, α]q (linear) array code, the encoding func-
tion is defined by an M × nα generator matrix G =
[g11, . . . ,g
α
1 | . . . |g1n, . . . ,gαn ] over Fq . Here, g1i , . . . ,gαi rep-
resent the encoding vectors associated with ci.
In order to store a file f on a DSS using a vector code C, f
is first encoded to a codeword c = (c1, c2, . . . , cn) ∈ C. Each
symbol of the codeword is then stored on a distinct node. In
particular, we have xi = ci, where xi denotes the content of
ith node.
B. Information flow graph
In their seminal work [12], Dimakis et al. model the opera-
tion of DSS using a multicasting problem over an information
flow graph. See Fig. 1 for illustration of an information flow
graph. The information flow graph consists of three types of
nodes:
• Source node (S): Source node contains M symbols of
the original file f . The source node is connected to n
nodes.
• Storage nodes (xi = (xini , x
out
i )): Each storage node in
DSS is represented by a pair of nodes in the information
flow graph: 1) input node xini and 2) output node x
out
i .
Here, xini denotes the data downloaded by node i, whereas
xouti denotes the α symbols actually stored on node i. An
edge of capacity α is introduced between xini and x
out
i in
order to enforce the storage constraint of α symbols per
node. For a newcomer node j, xinj is connected to output
nodes (xout) of d live nodes with links of capacity β
symbols each, representing the data downloaded during
a node repair.
• Data collector nodes (DCi): A data collector contacting
k storage nodes in DSS is modeled by a DC node
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Fig. 1: Information flow graph representation of DSS. In this particular example, the system has 4 live storage nodes at a time
while ensuring ‘any 2 out of 4’ property. Let node x1 fail first. A newcomer x5 contacts {x2,x3,x4} during the repair of x1.
In the event of failure of x2, nodes in {x3,x4,x5} send data to x6 for node repair. A data collector contacts 2 nodes {x5,x6}
out of 4 live nodes {x3,x4,x5,x6} to reconstruct the information stored on the system.
contacting output node (xout) of k live nodes in the
information flow graph by the edges of capacity∞ each.
For a given graph G and data collectors DCi, the file size
stored on such a DSS can be bounded using the max-flow-min
cut theorem for multicasting using network coding [35].
Lemma 2 (Max-flow-min-cut theorem for multicasting [12],
[35]).
M≤ min
G
min
DCi
maxflow(S→ DCi,G),
where flow(S → DCi,G) represents the flow from the source
node S to data collector DCi over the graph G.
Therefore, a file of size M can be delivered to a data
collector DC, only if the min-cut is at least M. In [12],
Dimakis et al. consider k successive node failures and evaluate
the min-cut over possible graphs, and obtain the bound given
by
M≤
k−1∑
i=0
min{(d− i)β, α}. (4)
This bound can be achieved by employing linear codes, linear
network code in particular. The codes that attain the bound in
(4) are known as regenerating codes [12]. Given a file sizeM,
a trade-off between storage per node α and repair bandwidth
γ , dβ can be established from (4). Two classes of codes
that achieve two extreme points of this trade-off are known
as minimum storage regenerating (MSR) codes and minimum
bandwidth regenerating (MBR) codes. The former is obtained
by first choosing a minimum storage per node α =M/k, and
then minimizing γ satisfying (4); on the other hand, the latter
is obtained by first finding the minimum possible γ, and then
finding the minimum α in (4). For MSR codes, we have:
(αmsr, βmsr) =
(M
k
,
M
k(d− k + 1)
)
. (5)
On the other hand, MBR codes are characterized by
(αmbr, βmbr) =
(
2Md
k(2d− k + 1) ,
2M
k(2d− k + 1)
)
. (6)
For a given DSS with d ≤ n−1, it can be observed that having
d = n − 1 reduces the repair bandwidth for both the MSR
and the MBR codes. Though the bound in (4) is derived for
functional repair, the bound applies to codes with exact repairs
as well. The achievability of the bound for all possible and a
subset of parameters has been shown at MBR and MSR points,
respectively. (See related work in Section I-C for details.)
Note that regenerating codes are vector codes with addi-
tional parameters d (number of nodes contacted during a node
repair) and β (amount of data downloaded from each contacted
node during node repair process). In what follows, we use
a modified notation for regenerating codes which highlights
these two parameters as well. We refer to regenerating codes as
an (n,M, dmin, α, β, d) regenerating code, where M denotes
the file size. In particular, an MSR code associated with an n
node DSS storing M symbols long file is referred to as an
(n,M, dmin = n− Mα + 1, α, β, d) MSR code.
C. Eavesdropper model
In this paper, we consider the eavesdropper model defined
in [14], which generalizes the eavesdropper model considered
in [13]. In [13], Pawar et al. consider a passive eavesdropper
with access to the data stored on ` (< k) storage nodes. The
eavesdropper is assumed to know the coding scheme employed
6by the DSS. At the MBR point, a newcomer downloads
αmbr = γmbr = dβmbr amount of data. Thus, an eavesdropper
does not gain any additional information if it is allowed to
access the data downloaded during repair. However, repair
bandwidth is strictly greater than the per node storage at the
MSR point; therefore, an eavesdropper potentially gains more
information if it has access to data downloaded during node
repair as well. Motivated by this, we consider an (`1, `2)
eavesdropper which can access the data stored on any `1
nodes with E1 denoting the set of indices of such nodes,
and, additionally, the eavesdropper observes the downloaded
data for any `2 node repairs. We use E2 to denote the set
of indices of `2 nodes where the eavesdropper accesses the
data downloaded during node repair. Hence, the eavesdropper
has access to xouti , x
in
j , x
out
j for i ∈ E1 and j ∈ E2. We
summarize the eavesdropper model together with the definition
of achievability of a secure file size in the following.
Definition 3 (Security against an (`1, `2) eavesdropper). A
DSS is said to achieve a secure file size of Ms against an
(`1, `2) eavesdropper, if, for any sets E1 and E2 of size `1 and
`2, respectively, I(fs; e) = 0, where fs denotes the secure
information of size Ms, and e represents the eavesdropper’s
observation vector given by e , {xouti , xinj , xoutj : i ∈ E1, j ∈
E2}.
Note that this definition coincides with the {`, `′} secure
distributed storage system in [14], where ` = `1 + `2 and
`′ = `2.
We remark that, as it will be clear from the following
sections, when we consider storing a secure file size Ms in
DSS, the remaining M−Ms symbols can be utilized as an
additional data which does not have security constraints. Yet,
noting the possibility of storing this insecure data, we will refer
to this uniformly distributed part as the random data, which is
utilized to achieve security. Throughout the text, we use the
following lemma to show that the proposed codes satisfy the
secrecy constraints.
Lemma 4 (Secrecy Lemma [7], [14]). Consider a system with
information bits fs, random bits r (independent of fs), and an
eavesdropper with observations given by e. If H(e) ≤ H(r)
and H(r|fs, e) = 0, then the mutual information leakage to
eavesdropper is zero, i.e., I(fs; e) = 0.
Proof: See Appendix A.
D. Maximum rank distance codes
The coding schemes presented in this paper involve a pre-
coding step, where the file f is encoded using a Gabidulin
code [36]. Gabidulin codes are an example of optimal
rank-metric codes, called maximum rank distance (MRD)
codes [36], [37]. Here, we give a brief description of rank-
metric codes and highlight various properties of Gabidulin
codes that are useful to understand our code constructions.
Let Fqm be en extension field of Fq . An element ν ∈ Fqm
can be represented as the vector ν= (ν1, . . . , νm)T ∈ Fmq ,
such that ν =
∑m
i=1 νibi, for a fixed basis {b1, . . . , bm} of the
extension field Fqm . Using this, a vector v = (v1, . . . , vN ) ∈
FNqm can be represented by an m×N matrix V = [vi,j ] over
Fq , which is obtained by replacing each vi of v by its vector
representation (vi,1, . . . , vi,m)T .
Definition 5. The rank of a vector v ∈ FNqm , denoted by
rank(v) is defined as the rank of its m × N matrix repre-
sentation V (over Fq). Similarly, for two vectors v,u ∈ FNqm ,
the rank distance is defined by
dR(v,u) = rank(V −U).
An [N,K,D]qm rank-metric code C ⊆ FNqm is a linear
block code over Fqm of length N with dimension K and
minimum rank distance D. A rank-metric code that attains
the Singleton bound D ≤ N − K + 1 in rank-metric is
called maximum rank distance (MRD) code. For m ≥ N , a
family of MRD codes, called Gabidulin codes, was presented
by Gabidulin [36]. Similar to Reed-Solomon codes, Gabidulin
codes can be obtained by evaluation of polynomials, however,
for Gabidulin codes a special family of polynomials, called
linearized polynomials, is used:
Definition 6. A linearized polynomial f (y) over Fqm of q-
degree t has the form
f (y) =
t∑
i=0
aiy
qi ,
where ai ∈ Fqm , and at 6= 0.
Encoding a message (f1, f2, . . . , fK) to a codeword of an
[N,K,D = N −K + 1] Gabidulin code over Fqm (m ≥ N )
consists of two steps [36]:
• Step 1: Construct a data polynomial f (y) =∑K
i=1 fiy
qi−1 over Fqm .
• Step 2: Evaluate f (y) at {y1, y2, . . . , yN} ⊂ Fqm , N
linearly independent (over Fq) points from Fqm , to obtain
a codeword c = (f (y1), . . . , f (yN )) ∈ FNqm .
Remark 7. Note that evaluation of a linearized polynomial is
an Fq-linear transformation from Fqm to itself [38]. In other
words, for any a, b ∈ Fq and ν1, ν2 ∈ Fqm , we have
f (aν1 + bν2) = af (ν1) + bf (ν2).
Remark 8. Given evaluations of f (·) at any K linearly
independent (over Fq) points in Fqm , say (z1, . . . , zK), one
can get evaluations of f (·) at qK points spanned by Fq-
linear combinations of (z1, . . . , zK) using Fq-linearity (a.k.a.
linearized property) of f (·). (See Remark 7.) This allows one
to recover polynomial f (·) of degree qK−1, and therefore, to
reconstruct data vector (f1, . . . , fK) by performing polyno-
mial interpolation. Therefore, an [N,K,D] Gabidulin code
(an MRD code in general) is an MDS code and thus can
correct any D − 1 = N − K erasures (symbols erasures in
the codeword, when it is considered as a vector over Fqm or
column erasures when it is considered as a matrix over Fq).
We refer to these erasures as rank erasures to distinguish from
node erasures (failures) in the sequel.
As described in Remark 8, Fq-linearity of the polynomials
used in encoding process of Gabidulin codes allows for the
7recovery of the original message from a sufficient number of
evaluations of the polynomial at linearly independent points.
Note that these evaluations points may potentially be different
from the points used during the encoding process. This makes
Gabidulin codes an attractive option to utilize for pre-coding
in the coding schemes for DSS presented in this paper,
where additional linear operations need to be performed on a
codeword from Gabidulin code to meet certain system require-
ments, e.g., small locality. The importance of this property
of Gabidulin codes becomes clear when we present analyses
of our different coding schemes in the remaining sections of
this paper. Towards this, we present the following result for
linearized polynomials that we utilize later to study various
code constructions proposed in this paper.
Lemma 9. Let p = (f (y1), f (y2), . . . , f (ytα)) ∈ Ftαqm be
the vector containing evaluation of a linearized polynomial
f (·) over Fqm at tα linearly independent (over Fq) points
{y1, y2, . . . , ytα}, and let cˆ = pGˆ be the codeword of an
[nˆ, tα, dmin = nˆ − t + 1, α]q MDS array code over Fq
(with Gˆ ∈ Ftα×nˆαq as its generator matrix) corresponding
to message vector p. Then, any s (out of nˆ) vector symbols
of cˆ = (cˆ1, . . . , cˆnˆ) ∈ (Fαqm)nˆ corresponds to evaluations of
f (·) at min{s, t}α linearly independent (over Fq) points from
the subspace spanned by {y1, y2, . . . , ytα} ⊂ Fqm .
Proof: See Appendix B.
The efficient decoding algorithms for Gabidulin codes can
be found e.g. in [39].
E. Locally repairable codes
In this subsection, we present a formal definition of locally
repairable codes. First, we define the notion of a punc-
tured vector code. Given an (n,M, dmin, α)q vector code C
([n,M = logqM,dmin, α]q in case of linear code) and a set
S ⊂ [n], we use C|S to denote the code obtained by puncturing
C on [n]\S. In other words, codewords of C|S are obtained by
keeping those vector symbols in c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C which
have their indices in set S.
Next, we present the definition of vector LRCs, which
generalizes the definition of scalar LRCs (α = 1) presented
in [15]. (See Fig. 2.)
Definition 10. An (n,M, dmin, α)q vector code C is said to
have (r, δ) locality if for each vector symbol ci ∈ Fαq , i ∈ [n],
of a codeword c = (c1, . . . , cn) ∈ C, there exists a set of
indices Γ(i) such that
• i ∈ Γ(i)
• |Γ(i)| ≤ r + δ − 1
• Minimum distance of C|Γ(i) is at least δ.
An (n,M, dmin, α)q vector code C with (r, δ) locality is
referred to as an (r, δ, α) locally repairable code (LRC).
Remark 11. (r, δ, α = 1) LRCs are named as (r, δ) scalar
LRCs.
Remark 12. The last requirement in Definition 10 implies that
each element j ∈ Γ(i) can be written as a function of any set
of r elements in Γ(i)\{j}. Moreover, the last two requirements
in the definition ensure that H(Γ(i)) ≤ rα.
Distinct sets in {Γ(i)}i∈[n] are called local groups. Note
that two nodes i1 6= i2 may have Γ(i1) = Γ(i2). We use g to
denote the number of distinct local groups in C. (See Fig. 2.)
The definition of LRCs presented in this paper generalizes that
given in [17], which is restricted to δ = 2. In order to store a
file f on a DSS using an LRC, f is first encoded to a codeword
of the LRC. Each symbol of the codeword is then stored on a
distinct node. In particular, we have xi = ci, where xi denotes
the content of ith node. It follows from Remark 12 that, for an
(r, δ, α) LRC, d = r is possible by using r nodes in Γ(i)\{i}
to repair node i.
Note that Definition 10 requires that each symbol in code-
word c is part of a local group, which ensures that every
encoded symbol can be repaired in a local manner. This
property of a code is termed as all-symbol locality in the
literature. When locality is ensured only for a subset of
symbols in c which is sufficient to recover the original data,
e.g., systematic symbols in a systematic code, the code is said
to have information locality. In this paper, we focus on codes
with all-symbol locality.
In [15], Prakash et al. present the following upper bound
on the minimum distance of an (r, δ) scalar LRC:
dmin ≤ n−M+ 1−
(⌈M
r
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1). (7)
It was established in [16] that Pyramid codes presented
in [32] attain this bound. Note that Pyramid codes have
information locality. An explicit construction of optimal scalar
LRCs with all-symbols locality is known only for the case
n =
⌈M
r
⌉
(r+δ−1) [15], [40]. Towards optimal scalar LRCs
for broader range of parameters, [15] establishes the existence
of scalar codes with all-symbols locality for the setting when
(r + δ − 1)|n, assuming the field size |F| > MnM. In this
paper, we provide an explicit construction of optimal scalar
LRCs with all-symbols locality for even broader range of
system parameters by relaxing the restriction of (r+ δ−1)|n.
Papailiopoulos et al. [17] present the following upper bound
on the minimum distance of an (r, δ = 2, α) LRC.
dmin ≤ n−
⌈M
α
⌉
−
⌈M
rα
⌉
+ 2 (8)
In [17], the authors also propose a construction of LRCs
with δ = 2 that achieve the bound in (8). In this paper, we
generalize this bound for any δ ≥ 2 and present (r, δ, α) LRCs
with multiple local parity nodes that are optimal with respect
to the generalized bound.
Here, we highlight a couple of advantages of LRCs with
multiple parity nodes per local group. These codes may allow
system administrators to deal with variability in response times
in a large scale storage system. In a large scale system, storage
nodes exhibit variable response time due to multiple reasons,
including resource sharing, software updates, maintenance
activities, and energy maintenance (turning on a node in power
saving mode introduces latency in its response time) [41].
In particular, some of the contacted nodes can take longer
than expected time to respond with data during node repair
(or direct data access from systematic nodes). In order to
mitigate this effect, an administrator can send data request
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Locally repairable code with r = 3 and δ = 3.
c1 c2 c3 c4 c5
First local group (G1)
Γ(1) = · · · = Γ(5)
c6 c7 c8 c9
Second local group (G2)
Γ(6) = · · · = Γ(9)
Fig. 2: Illustration of a 9-length (r = 3, δ = 3, α) locally repairable code. We have ci ∈ Fα, for each i ∈ [9]. The code has
two disjoint local groups: {c1, . . . , c5} and {c6, . . . , c9}. Brown nodes inside each local group highlight redundancy within
the local group.
to more than required number of nodes in a local group for
node repair, and complete the repair process as soon as the
required number of nodes from the set of contacted nodes have
responded with data. Similar ideas to reduce response time
for file reconstruction with MDS codes have been proposed
in [41], [42]. Besides this, LRCs having multiple local parities
per local group exhibit a stronger resilience to eavesdropping
attacks. In particular, as detailed in Section VI, both scalar
LRCs and vector LRCs with single local parity have poor
secrecy rate in the presence of a passive eavesdropper.
III. SECRECY IN REPAIR BANDWIDTH EFFICIENT DSS
Considering that the eavesdropped nodes may not carry
secure information to the data collectors in the bound given
by (4), [13] establishes the following upper bound on the
secure file size when the eavesdropper observes the content
of ` nodes.
Ms ≤
k∑
i=`+1
min{(d− i+ 1)β, α}. (9)
Pawar et al. show that this bound is tight in the bandwidth
limited regime, γ ≤ Γ = (n−1)α with d = n−1, by presenting
a coding scheme that is secure against the passive eaves-
dropper observing ` storage nodes. This scheme essentially
corresponds to the MBR point (see (6)) where a newcomer
node contacts all the remaining nodes. [14] proposes product
matrix based secure coding schemes achieving this bound for
any ` at the MBR point. However, the coding scheme proposed
in [14] can only store a secure file size of (k−`1−`2)(α−`2β)
at the MSR point. At the MSR point, the bound in (9) reduces
to
Ms ≤ (k − `1 − `2)α.
As a result, [14] concludes that the proposed scheme based
on product matrix codes achieves secrecy capacity only when
`2 = 0. This corresponds to the scenario for which the
eavesdroppers are not allowed to observe downloaded packets.
This leaves the following questions open:
• Can bound (9) be further tightened for MSR point?
• Is it possible to obtain secure coding schemes at the MSR
point that have better rate and/or secrecy capacity than
that of the scheme proposed in [14]?
In this section, we answer both questions affirmatively. We first
derive a generic upper bound on the amount of data that can
be securely stored on DSS for bandwidth efficient repairable
codes at the MSR point, which also applies to bandwidth
efficient exact-repairable code. Next, we prove a result specific
to exact-repairable code for d = n − 1 which allows us to
provide an upper bound on the secrecy capacity against an
(`1, `2)-eavesdropper at the MSR point. This bound is tighter
than a bound that can be obtained from the generic bound we
provide. We subsequently combine the classical secret sharing
scheme due to [19] with an existing class of exact-repairable
MSR codes to securely store data in the presence of an (`1, `2)-
eavesdropper. We show that this approach gives a higher rate
coding scheme compared to that of [14] and achieves the
secrecy capacity for any `1 with E2 ⊂ [k] and `2 ≤ 2.
A. Improved bound on secrecy capacity at the MSR point
In order to get the desired bound, we rely on the standard
approach of computing a cut in the information flow graph
associated with DSS. We consider a particular pattern of
eavesdropped nodes, where eavesdropper observes content put
on `1 nodes and data downloaded during first `2 node failures
that do not involve already eavesdropped `1 nodes. Using the
max-flow min-cut theorem, this case translates into an upper
bound on the secrecy capacity for an (n, k)-DSS operating at
the MSR point (see (5)).
Theorem 13. For an (n, k)-DSS employing an MSR code, we
have
Ms ≤
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
(α− I(xi;di,n+1, . . . ,di,n+`2)) , (10)
where xi and di,j denote the data stored on node i and the
data downloaded from node i to perform node repair at node
j, respectively. For a linear coding scheme, the bound in (10)
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Fig. 3: An information flow graph associated with an (n, k)-DSS in the presence of an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper. Red colored
nodes are observed by the eavesdropper. Note that we have xi = (xini , x
out
i ) in an information flow graph representation for
a DSS. In particular, we have E1 = {x1, . . . ,x`1} and E2 = {xn+1, . . . ,xn+`2}. Here, we assume that xk−`2+1, . . . ,xk fail
subsequently in the order specified by their indices and are repaired by introducing nodes xn+1, . . . ,xn+`2 respectively. Data
collector (DC) contacts x1, . . . ,xk−`2 ,xn+1, . . . ,xn+`2 to reconstruct the original data stored on the DSS.
reduces to the following.
Ms ≤
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
α− dim
 `2∑
j=1
Di,n+j
 . (11)
Here, Di,j denote the subspace spanned by the encoding
vectors associated with symbols transferred from node i to
node j during node repair.
Proof: Consider Fig. 3, which describes a particular
case that may arise during the lifespan of a DSS. Here,
x1,x2, . . . ,xn represent the original n storage nodes in DSS
as defined in Sec. II. Assume that nodes xk−`2+1, . . . ,xk
subsequently fail in the order specified by their indices. These
`2 failures are repaired by introducing nodes xn+1, . . . ,xn+`2
in the system following a node repair process associated
with the coding scheme employed by the DSS. Consider
E1 = {x1, . . . ,x`1} as the set of `1 nodes where eavesdropper
observes the stored content, and let E2 = {xn+1, . . . ,xn+`2}
be the set of nodes which are exposed to the eavesdropper
during their node repair, allowing eavesdropper to have access
to all the data downloaded during node repair of set E2.
Let R denote the set of k − (`1 + `2) remaining original
nodes {x`1+1, . . . ,xk−`2}, which are not observed by the
eavesdropper directly, and information stored on these nodes
may leak to eavesdroppers only when these nodes participate
in node repair. Assume that a data collector contacts a set of
k nodes given by K = E1 ∪E2 ∪R in order to reconstruct the
original data. For a file fs to be securely stored on the DSS,
we have
Ms = H(fs) = H(fs|xE1 ,dE2) (12)
= H(fs|xE1 ,dE2)−H(fs|xE1 ,xE2 ,xR) (13)
≤ H(fs|xE1 ,dE2)−H(fs|xE1 ,dE2 ,xR)
= I(fs;xR|xE1 ,dE2)
≤ H(xR|xE1 ,dE2)
≤ H(xR|dE2)
=
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
H(xi|x`1+1, . . . ,xi−1,dE2)
≤
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
H(xi|di,n+1, . . . ,di,n+`2)
=
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
(α− I(xi;di,n+1, . . . ,di,n+`2)) .
(14)
Here, (12) follows from the fact that coding scheme em-
ployed in DSS is secure against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper, i.e.,
I(fs;xE1 ,dE2) = H(f
s)−H(fs|xE1 ,dE2) = 0, and (13) is a
consequence of the fact that the original file can be recovered
from data stored on any set of k nodes.
For linear coding schemes, I(xi : di,n+1, . . . ,di,n+`2) can
be replaced by dim
(∑`2
j=1Di,n+j
)
to obtain
H(fs) ≤
k−`2∑
i=`1+1
α− dim
 `2∑
j=1
Di,n+j
 (15)
In Theorem 13, dim
(∑`2
j=1Di,n+j
)
is lower bounded by
β, and using this we obtain the following corollary.
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Corollary 14. For an (n, k)-DSS employing an (n,M, dmin =
n− Mα + 1, α, β, d) MSR code, we have
Ms ≤ (k − `1 − `2)(α− β). (16)
This shows that the secure code construction proposed in
[14] is optimal for `2 = 1.
The following lemma is specific to exact-repairable linear
MSR codes that employ interference alignment for node repair
with d = n−1. It is shown in [43] that interference alignment
is a necessary component of an exact-repairable linear scalar
(β = 1) MSR code. The necessity of interference alignment
holds for β > 1 as well. Therefore, the following bound is
fairly general and applies to all known exact-repairable codes
at the MSR point. Following the standard terminology in DSS
literature, node i has β × α repair matrices {Vi,j} associated
with remaining nodes j 6= i. In the event of failure of node j,
a newcomer downloads Vi,jxTi from every node i, i 6= j. We
use Vi,j to denote both matrix Vi,j and row-space of Vi,j .
Lemma 15. Consider an (n, k)-DSS employing a systematic
MSR code with (n− k) linear parity nodes. Assume that d =
n − 1, i.e., all the remaining nodes are contacted to repair
a failed node. Let Vi,j be the repair matrices associated with
node i, which is used to perform node repair for node j. Then,
for each i ∈ [k], i.e., for systematic nodes, we have
dim
⋂
j∈A
Vi,j
 = rank
⋂
j∈A
Vi,j
 ≤ α
(n− k)|A| , (17)
where A ⊆ [k]\{i}.
Proof: See Appendix C.
According to the notation specified in Section II, we have
di,j = Vi,jx
T
i . Therefore, subspace Di,j corresponds to the
row space spanned by Vi,j [g1i , . . . ,g
α
i ]
T . Here, g1i , . . . ,g
α
i
represent the encoding vectors associated with xi, i.e., xi =
f [g1i , . . . ,g
α
i ]. It follows from the well-known dimension
formula for vector spaces that
dim (Di,n+1 +Di,n+2) = dim (Di,n+1) + dim (Di,n+2)
− dim (Di,n+1 ∩ Di,n+2)
= β + β − dim (Di,n+1 ∩ Di,n+2)
≥ 2β − α
(n− k)2
= 2β − β
(n− k) , (18)
where (18) follows from Lemma 15 and the fact that β = αn−k
at the MSR point with d = n− 1. Now combining (18) with
Theorem 13, we get the following corollary:
Corollary 16. Given an (n, αk, n − k + 1, α, β, d = n −
1) MSR code that employs interference alignment to perform
node repair, for `2 ≤ 2 we have
Ms ≤ (k − `1 − `2) (α− θ (α, β, `2)) (19)
where
θ (α, β, `2) =
{
β, if `2 = 1
2β − β(n−k) , if `2 = 2
(20)
B. Construction of secure MSR codes with d = n− 1
In this subsection, we present a construction for an (`1, `2)-
secure coding scheme when E2 ⊂ S, for a given set S of size
|S| = k, i.e., the nodes where an eavesdropper observes all the
data downloaded during node repair are restricted to a specific
set of k nodes. The construction is based on concatenation of
Gabidulin codes [36] and zigzag codes [28]. The inner code,
zigzag code, allows bandwidth efficient repair4 of systematic
nodes with d = n− 1.
First, we present a brief description of the construction of
an (n, k) zigzag code [28]. Let p = n− k denote the number
of parity nodes and M = k(n − k)k = kpk be the size of
file that needs to be encoded. The kpk message symbols are
arranged in a pk × k array, and pk symbols in each of k
columns of the array are indexed using integers in [0, pk − 1].
Note that an integer in [0, pk − 1] can also be associated with
a vector in Zpk . Node j (j ∈ [k]) stores pk symbols from j-th
column of the array. Let xij for j ∈ [k] denote the symbol
in node j with index i. In order to generate (l + 1)-th parity
node, define zigzag sets Zlt = {xij : i + lej = t}, where
t and l ranges over integers in [0, pk − 1] and [0, p − 1],
respectively. Here, ej denotes the j-th standard basis vector
in Zpk that has all zero entries except 1 at j-th position.
Also, i is used to represent both an integer and its vector
representation in Zpk . Now, t-th symbol of (l + 1)-th parity
node is obtained by taking a linear combination (over Fq)
of symbols in the zigzag set Zlt . Note that each symbol for
a systematic node is used in exactly one linear combination
stored on each parity node. (The construction described here
corresponds to Construction 6 in [28] with m = k and
{v0, v1, . . . , vk−1} = {e1, e2, . . . , ek}.)
The repair of j-th systematic node (column) is performed
by accessing symbols in d = n − 1 surviving nodes, where
the downloaded symbol index (of each live node) belongs to
the set Yj = {i : i · ej = 0}. Here, a · b =
∑
i aibi (mod p)
denotes the dot product between a and b in Zpk . We first state
the following property associated with the repair process of a
zigzag code.
Lemma 17. Assume that an eavesdropper gains access to the
data stored on `1 nodes and the data downloaded during node
repair of `2 systematic nodes in an (n = k+p, k) zigzag code.
Then the eavesdropper can only observe
kpk − pk(k − `1 − `2)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
independent symbols.
Proof: See Appendix D
We now detail an achievability scheme of this section.
(See Fig. 4.) Let fs denote secure information of size
pk(k − `1 − `2)(1 − 1p )`2 symbols in Fmq . We take kpk −
pk(k − `1 − `2)(1 − 1p )`2 i.i.d. random symbols r =
4Zigzag codes achieve optimal rebuilding ratio, i.e., the ratio of dβ (the
amount of data that is read and transferred from the contacted nodes to a
newcomer node) to (n−1)α (total data stored on the surviving nodes). Since
zigzag codes have optimal rebuilding ratio, they are also repair bandwidth
efficient.
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Encoding for Gabidulin Code
f = (r, fs)
∈ Fkαqm
f (y) =
∑kα
i=1 fiy
qi−1 c = (c1, . . . , ckα)
=
(
f (y1), . . . , f (ykα)
) (n, k) zigzag code
Fig. 4: The proposed secure coding scheme at the MSR point.
(r1, . . . , rkpk−pk(k−`1−`2)(1− 1p )`2 ), distributed uniformly at
random over Fqm , and append r with fs to obtain f = (r, fs) ∈
Fkαqm . We then encode f in two stages as follows:
1) First, encode f = (f1, . . . , fkα), α = pk, using the
encoding process of a [kα, kα, 1]qm Gabidulin code as
specified in Section II-D. Let
f (y) =
kα∑
i=1
fiy
qi−1
be the underlying linearized polynomial used in the
encoding process.
2) Encode the codeword of the Gabidulin code, obtained
from the previous step, using a (k + p, k) zigzag code
defined over Fq , i.e., the encoding coefficient of the
zigzag code are from Fq . Store the output of this step
at n = k + p nodes in the storage system.
As described in Remark 7, f (·) is a Fq-linear function;
therefore, all the symbols stored on parity nodes of the zigzag
code are evaluations of f (·) at points in Fqm . (See also
Lemma 9).
Next, we present the following result on security of the
coding scheme described above, which performs secrecy pre-
coding using a Gabidulin code.
Theorem 18. The code obtained by performing secrecy pre-
coding of a zigzag code, as described above, with α = pk and
d = n− 1 achieves a secure file size
Ms = (k − `1 − `2)pk
(
1− 1
p
)`2
against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper with E2 ⊂ [k]. Here, p =
n − k, and [k] denotes the set of systematic nodes of zigzag
code. In addition, for any (`1, `2) such that `2 ≤ 2 and
E2 ⊂ [k], this code attains the upper bound on the secure
file size given in Corollary 16; hence, characterizes the secrecy
capacity at the MSR point with d = n−1 for a class of (`1, `2)-
eavesdroppers in which download eavesdropping is restricted
to the systematic nodes.
Proof: The repair and data reconstruction properties of
the proposed code follow from the construction of zigzag
codes [28]. We utilize Lemma 4 to prove the security of
this code against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper with E2 ⊂ [k].
Considering that e denotes the symbols stored on DSS that an
eavesdropper observes, we need to show: (i) H(e) ≤ H(r)
and (ii) H(r|e, fs) = 0 to establish the security of the
proposed coding scheme. It follows from Lemma 17 that
an eavesdropper observes kpk − pk(k − `1 − `2)
(
1− 1p
)`2
independent symbols, which correspond to evaluations of
f (·) at linearly independent (over Fq) points in Fqn . Since
|e| = kpk−pk(k−`1−`2)
(
1− 1p
)`2
, we have H(e) = H(r),
which is the first requirement to establish the security claim. It
remains to show H(e|r, fs) = 0, for which we describe how
an eavesdropper can decode random symbols r given e and
fs in the following.
When the eavesdropper is provided with fs in addition to
already known e, she can remove the contribution of fs from
the known |e| = kpk− pk(k− `1− `2)
(
1− 1p
)`2
evaluations
of the linearized polynomial
f (y) =
kpk∑
i=1
fiy
qi−1
to obtain |e| = kpk − pk(k − `1 − `2)
(
1− 1p
)`2
evaluations
(e˜) of another linearized polynomial
f˜ (y) =
|e|∑
i=1
riy
qi−1
at |e| = kpk−pk(k− `1− `2)
(
1− 1p
)`2
linearly independent
(over Fq) points in Fqm . From these evaluations of f˜ (·), using
Remark 8, the eavesdropper can decode the random symbols
r, which implies that H(r|fs, e) = 0. (We note that a similar
proof of security when utilizing polynomials for encoding
is provided in the seminal paper of A. Shamir on secret
sharing [19].)
Substituting `2 = 1 (or 2), α = pk and β = p
k
p = p
k−1 in
(19) shows that the proposed code construction achieves the
upper bound on secure file size, specified in Corollary 16, for
`2 ≤ 2.
Remark 19. In [44], Goparaju et al. obtain the following
upper bound on the secrecy capacity at the MSR point, when
E2 ⊂ [k] and d = n− 1,
Ms ≤ (k − `1 − `2)
(
1− 1
n− k
)`2
α. (21)
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c1 c5 c9
c2 c6 c10
c3 c7 c11
c4 c8 c12
c1 + c5 + c9
c2 + c6 + c10
c3 + c7 + c11
c4 + c8 + c12
c1 + 2c7 + c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
(a) (5, 3)-zigzag code.
c1 c5 c9
c2 c6 c10
c3 c7 c11
c4 c8 c12
c1 + c5 + c9
c2 + c6 + c10
c3 + c7 + c11
c4 + c8 + c12
c1 + 2c7 + c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
c1
(b) Observations of an eavesdropper with E1 = {1}.
c1 c9
c2 c10
c3 c11
c4 c12
c1 + c5 + c9
c2 + c6 + c10
c3 + c7 + c11
c4 + c8 + c12
c1 + 2c7 + c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
c1 c9
(c) Encoded symbols obtained by an eavesdropper by
observing repair of node 2.
c1 c5 c9
c2 c6 c10
c3 c7 c11
c4 c8 c12
c1 + c5 + c9
c2 + c6 + c10
c3 + c7 + c11
c4 + c8 + c12
c1 + 2c7 + c10
c2 + 2c8 + c9
c3 + c5 + c12
c4 + c6 + 2c11
c1
c2
c3
c4
c5
6
c9
c10
(d) Observations of a (1, 1)-eavesdropper with E1 = {1}
and E2 = {2}.
Fig. 5: Illustrations of a (5, 3)-DSS employing the proposed secure coding scheme. The output of Gabidulin pre-coding step
(c1, c2, . . . , c12) is stored on 5 node DSS using a (5, 3)-zigzag code [28]. In this example, the eavesdropper is associated with
E1 = {1} and E2 = {2}.
Therefore, this bound along with the coding scheme presented
in this paper characterize the secrecy capacity at the MSR
point, when E2 ⊂ [k] [44, Theorem 3].
Remark 20. Zigzag codes, used in constructing secure coding
scheme in this paper, do not allow bandwidth efficient repair
of parity nodes. However, a related class of codes with α =
(n − k)k+1 [29] allow bandwidth efficient repair for parity
nodes as well. The repair set Yj for j ∈ [k] (systematic nodes)
for this class of codes have an intersection pattern similar to
that of Zigzag codes. Therefore, Lemma 17 and consequently
Theorem 18 hold (with new value of α) even when zigzag
codes are replaced with the codes presented in [29]. The uses
of codes from [29] also give optimal coding schemes when
|E2 ∩ {k + 1, . . . , k + p = n}| ≤ 1. (The proof of this follows
from the techniques developed in this section, and we omit the
details for brevity.)
IV. NEW BOUNDS AND CONSTRUCTIONS FOR LOCALLY
REPAIRABLE CODES
In this section, we study the notion of local-repairability
for DSS. As opposed to the line of work on scalar locally
repairable codes (LRCs) [15], [16], [32], where each node
stores a scalar over a field from a codeword, we consider
vector-LRCs [17], [31]. Our results can be specialized to
scalar-LRCs by restricting node size α to 1. Furthermore, the
vector-LRCs that we consider, as defined in Section II, allow
for the possibility of α >M/k, and non-trivial locality, i.e.,
δ > 2. Thus, these codes are generalizations of the vector-
LRCs studied in [17] which considered only the δ = 2 case.
We note that we are particularly interested in vector-LRCs
with multiple local parities per local group.
We first derive an upper bound on the minimum distance
of (r, δ, α) LRCs, which also applies to non-linear codes. We
follow the proof technique of [16], [17], which is given for the
single local parity per local group case, by modifying it for
multiple local parity nodes per local group. The bound derived
in this section gives the bound presented in [15] as a special
case without the assumption of having a systematic code. As
noted in [17], the bound on dmin establishes a resilience vs.
per node storage trade-off, where per node storage α can be
increased overM/k to obtain higher minimum distance. This
is of particular interest in the design of codes having both
local-repairability and strong resilience to node failures.
We then propose a general code construction for LRCs that
achieve the derived bound on minimum distance of such codes.
We use Gabidulin codes along with MDS array codes to obtain
this construction.
A. Upper bound on dmin for an (r, δ, α) locally repairable
code
Here, we state a generic upper bound on the minimum
distance of an (r, δ, α) LRC. We use the alternative definition
of minimum distance dmin provided in Section II-A.
Theorem 21. Let C be an (r, δ, α) LRC over F of length n and
cardinality |F|M. Then, the minimum distance of C satisfies
dmin(C) ≤ n−
⌈M
α
⌉
+ 1−
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1). (22)
Proof: In order to get this upper bound on the minimum
distance of an LRC, we utilize the dual definition of minimum
distance of a code as given in (2). Similar to the proof in [16]
and [17], we construct a set A ⊆ [n] such that
H(cA) <M. (23)
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1: Set A0 = ∅ and i = 1.
2: while H(cAi−1) <M do
3: Pick a coded block cji /∈ Ai−1 s.t. |Γ(ji)\Ai−1| ≥
δ − 1.
4: if H(cAi−1 , cΓ(ji)) <M then
5: set Ai = Ai−1 ∪ Γ(ji)
6: else if H(cAi−1 , cΓ(ji)) ≥ M and ∃B ⊂ Γ(ji) s.t.
H(cAi−1 , cB) <M then
7: set Ai = Ai−1 ∪ B
8: else
9: i = i+ 1, end while
10: end if
11: i = i+ 1
12: end while
13: Output: A = Ai−1
Fig. 6: Construction of a set A with H(cA) < M for an
(r, δ, α) LRC.
This along with (2) in Definition 1 give us the desired upper
bound on dmin(C). Here, c ∈ C denote a codeword selected
uniformly at random from FM codewords in C.
The algorithm of construction of set A is given in Fig. 6.
Next, we show a lower bound on the size of the set A, output
of the algorithm described in Fig. 6. Note that at each iteration
of the while loop in Fig. 6, the algorithm increases the size
of the set Ai−1 by at most r + δ − 1 to get Ai. For each i,
define
ai = |Ai| − |Ai−1|. (24)
and
hi = H(cAi)−H(cAi−1). (25)
Assume that the algorithm terminates at (`+ 1)th iteration,
i.e., A = A`. Then, it follows from (24) and (25) that
|A| = |A`| =
∑`
i=1
ai, (26)
and,
H(cA) = H(cA`) =
∑`
i=1
hi. (27)
Consider two cases depending on the way the algorithm in
Fig. 6 terminates:
Case 1: Assume that the algorithm terminates with the final
set assigned at step 5, i.e., after adding Γ(j`) to A`−1. Now
we have from (r, δ) locality of the code that
hi = H(cAi)−H(sAi−1)
= H(cAi−1∪(Ai\Ai−1))−H(cAi−1)
= H(cAi−1) +H(cAi\Ai−1 |cAi−1)−H(cAi−1)
= H(cAi\Ai−1 |cAi−1)
≤ (ai − δ + 1)α. (28)
The last inequality follows from the fact that any block in Γ(ji)
can be written as a function of any set of r blocks in Γ(ji) and
the fact that we pick i in step 3 only if |Γ(ji)\Ai−1| ≥ δ− 1.
Since at the end of ith iteration, we have all the elements of
Γ(ji) added to Ai, out of which ai blocks are added at the
ith iteration. These newly added packets can not contribute
more than (ai− (δ−1))α to the entropy of set Ai as δ−1 of
these packets are deterministic function of other newly added
blocks of Γ(ji) and blocks of Γ(ji) that were already present
in Ai−1. From (28), we have that
ai ≥ hi
α
+ δ − 1. (29)
Now using (26)
|A| = |A`| =
∑`
i=1
ai
≥
∑`
i=1
(
hi
α
+ δ − 1
)
=
1
α
∑`
i=1
hi + (δ − 1)`.
(30)
Similar to the proof of Papailiopoulos et al. [17], we have
∑`
i=1
hi =
(⌈M
α
⌉
α− α
)
, (31)
and
` =
⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1. (32)
It follows from (30), (31), and (32) that
|A`| ≥
⌈M
α
⌉
− 1 +
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1). (33)
Case 2: The proof of this case is exactly similar to that
in [16] except a few minor modification. Consider that the
algorithm terminates with the final set assigned at step 7 in
`th iteration. Since it reaches the step 7, we have
H(cA`−1∪Γ(j`)) ≥M. (34)
As the increment in the entropy is at most rα at each iteration,
we have
` ≥
⌈M
rα
⌉
(35)
For i ≤ `− 1, from (29)
ai ≥ hi
α
+ δ − 1. (36)
For i = `,
a` ≥ h`
α
. (37)
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Next, it follows from (26), (35), (36), and (37) that
|A`| =
∑`
i=1
ai
≥
`−1∑
i=1
(
hi
α
+ δ − 1
)
+
h`
α
=
1
α
∑`
i=1
hi + (`− 1)(δ − 1)
≥ 1
α
(⌈M
α
⌉
α− α
)
+
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1)(38)
=
⌈M
α
⌉
− 1 +
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1) (39)
where (38) follows from (35) and (31). Now combining (2),
(33), and (39), we get
dmin(C) ≤ n−
⌈M
α
⌉
+ 1−
(⌈M
rα
⌉
− 1
)
(δ − 1). (40)
For the special case of δ = 2, this bound matches with the
bound obtained in [17]. For the case of M = k and α = 1,
the bound reduces to dmin(C) ≤ n−k+1+(dk/re−1)(δ−1),
which is coincident with the bound presented in [15].
B. Construction of dmin-optimal locally repairable codes
In this subsection, we present a construction of an (r, δ, α)
LRC, which attains the bound given in Theorem 21. Given a
file (over Fqm ) to be stored on DSS, we encode the file in two
steps before placing it on DSS. First, the file is encoded using
a Gabidulin code. The codeword (over Fqm ) of the Gabidulin
code is partitioned into local groups; then, each of these local
groups is encoded using an MDS array code over Fq (i.e., its
generator matrix is defined over Fq). This construction can be
viewed as a generalization of the construction for scalar LRCs
proposed in [34].
Construction I. Consider a file f over F = Fqm of size
M≥ rα, where m will be defined in the sequel. In addition,
let n, r, and δ be positive integers such that r+δ−1 < n. We
use g =
⌈
n
r+δ−1
⌉
to denote the number of local groups in an
LRC obtained by the construction proposed here. Depending
on whether (r + δ − 1) divides n or not, the details of the
construction are as follows:
• Case 1 ((r + δ − 1)|n): Let N = nrαr+δ−1 , m ≥ N , and
CGab be an [N,K =M, D = N −M+ 1]qm Gabidulin
code. The encoding process of file f consists of two steps:
1) First, encode M symbols of f to a codeword c ∈
CGab, and partition c into g = Nrα disjoint groups,
each of size rα. Each group is then stored on a
different set of r nodes, α symbols per node.
2) Next, generate δ − 1 parity nodes per group by
applying an [(r+ δ−1), rα, δ, α]q MDS array code
on each local group of r nodes, treating these r
nodes as input data blocks (of length α) for the
MDS array code.
At the end of this encoding process, we have n = g(r+
δ − 1) = Nα + Nrα (δ − 1) nodes, each storing α symbols
over Fqm ; and g local groups, each of size r − δ + 1.
• Case 2 (n (mod r + δ − 1)− (δ − 1) > 0): Let β0, 1 ≤
β0 ≤ r − 1, be an integer such that n = b nr+δ−1c(r +
δ − 1) + β0 + δ − 1 = (g − 1)(r + δ − 1) + β0 + δ − 1.
Let N = (g − 1)rα + β0α, m ≥ N , and CGab be an
[N,M, D = N −M + 1]qm Gabidulin code. Two step
encoding process for f is described as follows:
1) First, encode M symbols of f to a codeword c ∈
CGab, and partition c into g − 1 disjoint groups of
size rα and one additional group of size β0α. First
g − 1 groups are stored on r(g − 1) nodes, and the
last group is stored on β0 nodes, each node storing
α symbols.
2) Next, generate δ − 1 parity nodes per group by
applying an [(r+ δ−1), rα, δ, α]q MDS array code
on each of the first g − 1 local groups of r nodes,
and by applying a [(β0 + δ − 1), β0α, δ, α]q MDS
array code on the last local group.
At the end of the second step of encoding, we have n =
(g − 1)(r + δ − 1) + (β0 + δ − 1) = Nα +
⌈
N
rα
⌉
(δ − 1)
nodes, each storing α symbols over Fqm ; and g local
groups, g−1 of which have size r−δ+1 and one group
of size β0 + δ − 1.
The output of the Construction I is denoted by Cloc.
Remark 22. Note that the output of the first encoding step
generates the encoded data stored on rg and r(g − 1) + β0
nodes in case 1 and case 2, respectively. Each of these nodes
stores α symbols of a (folded) Gabidulin codeword.
Before proceeding to show the optimality of Construction
I with respect to the minimum distance bound in (22), we
present the following result which we use later in this paper.
Lemma 23. Let si, for i ∈ [g], denotes the number of
nodes observed in i-th local group of a DSS employing Cloc.
Then, the data stored on the observed nodes corresponds to
the evaluations of the underlying linearized polynomial f (·)
at
∑g
i=1 min{si, r}α and
∑g−1
i=1 min{si, r}α + min{sg, β0}
linearly independent (over Fq) points from Fqm in case 1 and
case 2 of Construction I, respectively.
Proof: Here, we present the proof only for case 1, i.e.,
(r + δ − 1)|n. The claim for case 2 can be proved using
the similar steps. Note that the second step of Construction
I encodes evaluations of a linearized polynomial at different
sets of linearly independent (over Fq) points using MDS array
codes (defined over Fq); therefore, Lemma 9 is applicable.
Let {f (y(i−1)rα+1), . . . , f (yirα)} denote the symbols of a
Gabidulin codeword that are encoded using an MDS array
code in i-th local group, for i ∈ [g]. It follows from Lemma 9
that any s ≤ r nodes (vector symbols) inside a local group
of Cloc correspond to evaluations of the underlying linearized
polynomial at sα linearly independent (over Fq) points in the
subspace spanned by yi = {y(i−1)rα+1, . . . , yirα}. For s > r,
on the other hand, any s vector symbols of a local group
can only have rα linearly independent points (over Fq). Since
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points in y = {y1, . . . ,yg} are linearly independent, i.e., the
evaluation points of one group are linearly independent on the
evaluation points of any other group, we have that the data
obtained from
∑g
i=1 si nodes, si nodes from i-th local group,
corresponds to the evaluations of f (·) at ∑gi=1 min{si, r}α
linearly independent (over Fq) points in Fqm .
Lemma 23 also implies that any δ − 1 + i node erasures
in a local group correspond to iα rank erasures (in the
corresponding Gabidulin codeword). Next, we provide the
conditions for parameters of the code Cloc obtained from
Construction I to be a dmin-optimal (r, δ, α) LRC.
Theorem 24. Let Cloc be an (r, δ, α) LRC of length n and
cardinality |F|M obtained by Construction I. Then,
• If (r+δ−1)|n, then Cloc over F = Fqm , for m ≥ nrαr+δ−1
and q ≥ (r + δ − 1), attains the bound (22).
• If n(mod r + δ − 1) − (δ − 1) ≥ ⌈Mα ⌉ (mod r) > 0,
then Cloc over F = Fqm , for m ≥
α
(
n− (δ − 1)
(⌊
n
r+δ−1
⌋
+ 1
))
and q ≥ (r + δ − 1),
attains the bound (22).
Proof: The proof is based on Lemma 23. We note that
any n− ⌈Mα ⌉− (⌈Mrα⌉− 1) (δ− 1) node erasures correspond
to at most D− 1 rank erasures (erasures in the corresponding
Gabidulin codeword) which can be corrected by the Gabidulin
code CGab. See the details in Appendix E.
Specializing the Construction I to scalar case (α = 1), we
obtain explicit (r, δ) scalar LRCs for the settings of parame-
ters, where only results on existence of scalar LRCs are present
in literature. For scalar case, Construction I employs MDS
codes instead of MDS array codes after encoding information
symbols f with Gabidulin codes. The following corollary (of
Theorem 24) summarizes our contributions towards designing
scalar-LRCs.
Corollary 25. Let Cloc be a (r, δ) scalar LRC obtained by
Construction I. Then,
• If (r+δ−1)|n, then Cloc over F = Fqm , for m ≥ nrr+δ−1
and q ≥ (r + δ − 1), attains the bound (7).
• If n(mod r+δ−1)−(δ−1) ≥M(mod r) > 0, then Cloc
over F = Fqm , for m ≥
(
n− (δ − 1)
(⌊
n
r+δ−1
⌋
+ 1
))
and q ≥ (r + δ − 1), attains the bound (7).
Remark 26. The required field size |F| = qm for the proposed
construction should satisfy m ≥ N , given a choice of q ≥
(r + δ − 1), where N = nrr+δ−1 for the first case and N =(
n− (δ − 1)
(⌊
n
r+δ−1
⌋
+ 1
))
for the second case. So, we
can assume that |F| = qN . Here, the requirement of q ≥
(r+δ−1) is enforced as it is a sufficient condition for having
an (r + δ − 1, r) MDS code.
We illustrate the construction of Cloc in the following
examples. First, we consider the scalar case.
Example 27. Consider the following system parameters:
(M, n, r, δ, α) = (9, 14, 4, 2, 1).
Here, we have r + δ − 1 = 5 and 14 (mod 5) − 1 = 3;
therefore, the given choice of parameters corresponds to the
f ∈ F9q11
[11, 9, 3]q11 Gabidulin code
a1 a2 a3 a4 b1 b2 b3 b4 c1 c2 c3
MDS codes over Fq
a1 a2 a3 a4 pa
local group 1
b1 b2 b3 b4 pb
local group 2
c1 c2 c3 pc
local group 3
Fig. 7: Illustration of the construction of a scalar
(r = 4, δ = 2, α = 1) LRC for n = 14,M = 9 and dmin = 4.
second case of Construction I. Since n =
⌊
14
4+2−1
⌋
· (4 +
2 − 1) + (3 + 2 − 1), let N =
⌊
14
4+2−1
⌋
· 4 + 3 = 11. First,
M = 9 symbols over F = F511 are encoded into a codeword
c of an [11, 9, 3]511 Gabidulin code CGab. This codeword is
partitioned into three groups, two of size 4 and one of size 3,
as follows: c = (a1, a2, a3, a4|b1, b2, b3, b4|c1, c2, c3). Then,
we add one parity to each group by applying a [5, 4, 2] MDS
code over F5 in the first two groups and a [4, 3, 2] MDS code
over F5 in the last group. The symbols of c with three new
parities pa, pb, pc are stored on 14 nodes as shown in Fig 7.
It follows from Theorem 21 that the minimum distance dmin
of this code is at most 4. To figure out the minimum distance
of the code, we first observe from Lemma 23 that any 3
node erasures translate into at most 2 rank erasures. Then,
observing that these rank erasures can be corrected by CGab
(as it has D = 3 here), we obtain that dmin = 4. In addition,
when a single node fails, it can be repaired by using the data
stored on all the other nodes from the same local group.
Next, we describe Construction I for vector-LRCs with the
help of the following example.
Example 28. We consider a DSS with the following parame-
ters:
(M, n, r, δ, α) = (28, 15, 3, 3, 4).
First, r + delta − 1 = 5, then r + δ − 1|n, and we consider
the first case in Construction I. Let N = 15·3·43+3−1 = 36
and (a1, . . . , a12, b1, . . . , b12, c1, . . . , c12) be a codeword of a
[36, 28, 9]q36 code CGab, which is obtained by encoding M =
28 symbols over F = Fq36 of the original file. The Gabidulin
codeword is then partitioned into three groups (a1, . . . , a12),
(b1, . . . , b12), and (c1, . . . , c12). Encoded symbols from each
group are stored on three storage nodes as shown in Fig. 8. In
the second stage of encoding, a [5, 12, 3, 4]q MDS array code
over Fq is applied on each local group to obtain δ − 1 = 2
16
parity nodes per local group. The coding scheme is illustrated
in Fig. 8.
It follows from Theorem 21 that the minimum distance of an
LRC with the parameters of this example is at most 5. Using
Lemma 23, we conclude that any 4 node failures correspond
to at most 8 rank erasures in the corresponding codeword of
CGab. Since the minimum rank distance of CGab is 9, these
node erasures can be corrected by CGab; thus, the minimum
distance of Cloc is exactly 5.
1 2 3 4 5
a1 a5 a9 pa11 p
a
12
a2 a6 a10 pa21 p
a
22
a3 a7 a11 pa31 p
a
32
a4 a8 a12 pa41 p
a
42
local group 1
6 7 8 9 10
b1 b5 b9 pb11 p
b
12
b2 b6 b10 pb21 p
b
22
b3 b7 b11 pb31 p
b
32
b4 b8 b12 pb41 p
b
42
local group 2
11 12 13 14 15
c1 c5 c9 pc11 p
c
12
c2 c6 c10 pc21 p
c
22
c3 c7 c11 pc31 p
c
32
c4 c8 c12 pc41 p
c
42
local group 3
Fig. 8: Example of an (r = 3, δ = 3, α = 4) LRC with
n = 15, M = 28 and dmin = 5.
V. REPAIR BANDWIDTH EFFICIENT LOCALLY REPAIRABLE
CODES
In this section, we introduce the notion of repair bandwidth
for LRCs, and present hybrid codes that allow for local
repairs while minimizing repair bandwidth for given locality
parameters. As pointed out in Section II-E, LRCs allow for
naı¨ve repair process, where a newcomer contacts r nodes in
its local group and downloads all the data stored on these r
nodes. The newcomer then regenerates the data stored on the
failed node and stores it for future operations. In this section,
following the line of work on repair bandwidth efficient DSS
due to [12], we consider allowing a newcomer to contact
more than r nodes in its local group in order to repair
the failed node. The motivation behind this is to lower the
repair bandwidth of an LRC. (This also improves the secrecy
capacity of such codes as detailed in Section VI.) The main
idea here is to apply a regenerating code in each local group.
(We note that, in a parallel and independent work, Kamath et
al. [18] also proposed utilizing regenerating codes to perform
efficient local repairs.).
First, we provide an upper bound on the amount of data that
can be stored on a locally repairable DSS while supporting a
given repair bandwidth dβ and the maximum possible failure
resilience (i.e., maximum possible minimum distance). We
then present dmin-optimal LRCs which attain this bound by
applying an MSR code in each local group instead of any
MDS array code in the second step of Construction I. We
denote such codes by MSR-LRC.
A. File size upper bound for repair bandwidth efficient LRCs
In the rest of this section, we restrict ourselves to LRCs that
have the maximum possible minimum distance as described in
(22). Moreover, we restrict ourselves to (r+δ−1)|n case. We
remark that, for (r + δ − 1)|n, the upper bound on minimum
distance for LRCs given in (22) is achievable only if the
code have disjoint local groups [18]. Let G1, . . . ,Gg denote
g = nr+δ−1 disjoint sets of indices of storage nodes with Gi
representing (r + δ − 1) nodes in i-th local group. A failed
node in a particular local group is repaired by contacting d
remaining nodes within the group, where r ≤ d ≤ r + δ − 2.
A newcomer downloads β symbols from each of these d nodes
during the node repair process.
Next, we perform the standard max-flow min-cut based
analysis for locally repairable DSS by mapping it to a mul-
ticasting problem on a dynamic information flow graph. The
information flow graph representation of a locally repairable
DSS is obtained by modifying the information flow graph
for classical DSS [12]. This is first introduced in [17] for
naı¨ve repair, where the newcomer contacts r nodes during
node repair. We assume a sequence of node failures and node
repairs as shown in Fig. 9. We further assume that each local
group encounters the same sequence of node failures and node
repairs that are performed as result of these failures. Each
data collector contacts n − dmin + 1 storage nodes for data
reconstruction. A data collector is associated with the nodes
it contacts for data reconstruction, and we represent the data
collector by (K1,K2, . . . ,Kg). Here, Ki ⊆ Gi is the set of
indices of nodes that the data collector contacts in i-th local
group and
∑g
i=1 |Ki| = n − dmin + 1. Next, we derive an
upper bound on the amount of data that can be stored on an
(n, n− dmin + 1)-DSS employing an (r, δ, α) LRC. Note that
an (n, n−dmin +1)-DSS allows a data collector to recover the
original file from the data stored on any set of n − dmin + 1
nodes. This upper bound is used to derive a repair bandwidth
vs. per node storage trade-off for minimum distance optimal
(r, δ, α) LRCs. In what follows, we add two more parameters
in the representation of LRCs and denote them by the tuple
(r, δ, α, β, d). These parameters along with n and M, the
number of nodes and the file size, characterize a bandwidth
efficient dmin-optimal LRC.
Theorem 29. For an n-node DSS employing an (r, δ, α, β, d)
LRC to store a file of size M, we have
M≤ min
{
rα,
h−1∑
i=0
min{max{(d− i)β, 0}, α}
}
(41)
+
µ∑
j=1
min
{
rα,
r+δ−2∑
i=0
min{max{(d− i)β, 0}, α}
}
,
where µ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
and h = n − dmin + 1 − (r + δ −
1)
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
.
Proof: Consider a data collector with K1 = G1,K2 =
G2, . . . ,Kµ = Gµ,Kµ+2 = . . . = Kg = ∅, and Kµ+1 ⊂ Gµ+1
such that |Kµ+1| = h. Now, the bound in (41) follows by
finding various cuts in the information flow graph (Fig. 9).
For each group, we consider cuts similar to the ones given
in [12]. Here, the data collector connects to h nodes for the
first term in (41) and r+δ−1 nodes for each of the terms in the
summation of the second term in (41). Now, consider the i-th
node out of k˜ nodes that data collector connects in a particular
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Fig. 9: Flow graph for (r, δ, α, β, d) LRC. In this graph, node pairs {Γini ,Γouti }gi=1 with edge of capacity rα enforce the
requirement that each local group has at most rα entropy. Here η and τ denote r + δ − 1 and n − (r + δ − 1)(g − 1)
respectively. The figure illustrates the case where x1 and x2 sequentially fail and are replaced by introducing xn+1 and xn+2
respectively. The data collector (DC) is assumed to contact a set of n− dmin + 1 nodes for reconstruction of original data.
group. (Here, k˜ = h, or k˜ = r+ δ− 1 as described above.) A
cut between xini and x
out
i for each node gives a cut-value of α.
On the other hand, for i = 0, · · · , k˜−1, if the cut is such that
xini belongs to the data collector side, we consider that (d− i)
live nodes are connected together with i nodes that have been
previously repaired. In our setup, for such a cut, the cut-value
evaluates to max{(d − i)β, 0}. For i > d, the repair node is
considered to contact only the previously repaired nodes, and
hence does not contribute to the maximum flow.
Note that the codes that are under consideration have
property that each local group has entropy of rα and any
set of r nodes has rα independent symbols. (See definition
of (r, δ, α) LRC in Section II-E.) Therefore, node repairs
within each local group have to ensure this property. This
implies that each local group and its repair can be related to
an (r + δ − 1, r, δ, α, β, d) MSR code with a file of size rα.
Hence, when a data collector connects to any r nodes in a
group, it can get all the information that particular group has
to offer. Therefore, similar to the analysis given in [12] for
the classical setup, the parameters need to satisfy
rα =
r−1∑
i=0
min{(d− i)β, α}, (42)
which leads to the requirement of (d− i)β ≥ α for each i =
0, · · · , r − 1. Then, minimum β is obtained as β∗ = αd−r+1 .
When node repairs are performed by downloading β∗ symbols
from d nodes for each failed node, the bound in (41) reduces
to
M≤ µrα+ min{h, r}α (43)
where µ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
and h = n − dmin + 1 − (r + δ −
1)
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, as defined in Theorem 29. This establishes the
file size bound for bandwidth efficient dmin-optimal LRCs.
B. Construction of repair bandwidth efficient dmin-optimal
LRCs
Now it is clear that a node repair within a local group of an
(r, δ, α) LRC is performed by treating each local group as an
(r+δ−1, rα, δ, α, β∗, d) MSR regenerating code. Remarkably,
the code obtained by Construction I described in Section IV-B
achieves the bound (43) when an MSR code is employed for
the second stage of encoding and we have α|M. We establish
this claim in the following theorem.
Theorem 30. Let Cloc be a code obtained from the Construc-
tion I described in Sec. IV-B with α = Mk and an MSR code
(over Fq) employed in the second stage of encoding to generate
local parities. If α|M, then Cloc attains the bound (43), i.e.,
the size of a file that can be stored by using Cloc satisfies
M = µrα+ min{h, r}α
where µ =
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
and h = n − dmin + 1 − (r + δ −
1)
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
.
Proof: Lets assume that α|M. Then, we can write M =
α(α1r + β1), for some integers 0 ≤ α1, β1, s.t. β1 ≤ r − 1.
Then, by (22),
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• If β1 > 0 then n − dmin + 1 = (α1r + β1) + α1(δ −
1) = (r + δ − 1)α1 + β1, hence h = β1 < r and⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
rα+ min{h, r}α = α1rα+ β1α =M.
• If β1 = 0 then n− dmin + 1 = α1r+ (α1 − 1)(δ − 1) =
(r+δ−1)(α1−1)+r, hence h = r and
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
rα+
min{h, r}α = (α1 − 1)rα+ rα =M.
This establishes that the output of Construction I Cloc attains
the file size bound given in (43) when an MSR code is used
to generate its local parities.
In the following example, we illustrate the aforementioned
construction for repair bandwidth efficient LRCs for a partic-
ular choice for system parameters.
Example 31. Consider the parameters given in Example 28.
Now we apply an (r + δ − 1 = 5, rα = 12, dmin = 3, α =
4, β = 2, d = 4) exact-MSR code (e.g., (5,3)-zigzag code [28])
in each group instead of an MDS array code. For these
parameters, h = 1, and by (43), M ≤ 2 · 3 · 4 + 1 · 4 = 28,
thus the code attains the bound (43). Moreover, each failed
node can be repaired bandwidth efficiently as an exact-MSR
code is used within each local group.
VI. SECRECY IN LOCALLY REPAIRABLE DSS
In this section, we analyze locally repairable DSS in the
presence of security constraints. We restrict ourselves to dmin-
optimal locally repairable DSS and consider the eavesdropping
model defined in Section II-C. We first derive a generic
upper bound on secrecy capacity, the amount of data that can
be stored on a DSS without leaking any information to an
eavesdropper, for an (r, δ, α, β, d) LRC. We later specialize
the bound to specific cases of system parameters. While ad-
dressing specific cases, we also present constructions of secure
coding schemes that achieve the respective upper bounds for
certain set of system parameters.
Similar to Section V-A, we associate a data collector with
n − dmin + 1 nodes it contacts to reconstruct the original
file. Let Ki denote the indices of nodes that are contacted by
the data collector in i-th local group, and K = ∪gi=1Ki with
|K| = n − dmin + 1. Again, we classify eavesdropped nodes
into two classes: E1 contains storage-eavesdropped nodes (`1
nodes in total), and E2 contains download-eavesdropped nodes
(`2 nodes in total). Considering i-th local group, we denote
the set of indices of storage-eavesdropped nodes in ith local
group as E i1 and download-eavesdropped nodes as E i2. Here,
we have E1 = ∪gi=1E i1, E2 = ∪gi=1E i2. Let `i1 = |E i1| and
`i2 = |E i2| denote the number of storage-eavesdropped and
download-eavesdropped nodes in i-th local group, respectively.
Note that
∑g
i=1 l
i
1 = `1 and
∑g
i=1 l
i
2 = `2. We denote X to
represent set of tuples
({E i1}gi=1, {E i2}gi=1, {Ki}gi=1) satisfying
these requirements. In the following, we provide our generic
upper bound on the secrecy capacity of (r, δ, α, d, β) LRCs
against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper.
Lemma 32. For a DSS employing an (r, δ, α, β, d) LRC that
is secure against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper, we have
Ms ≤
g∑
i=1
H(sKi |sEi1 ,dEi2) ∀
({E i1, E i2,Ki}gi=1) ∈ X , (44)
where X denotes the set of tuples ({E i1, E i2,Ki}gi=1) that are
allowed under our model.
Proof: Without loss of generality, we can focus on sets
of indices {E i1}gi=1 and {E i2}gi=1 such that |E i1∪E i2| ≤ r for the
purpose of obtaining an upper bound on the secrecy capacity
as eavesdropping r nodes in a group gives the eavesdropper
all the information that the group has to offer. As introduced
in Section II, we represent stored and downloaded content at
node i (set A) as xi and di (respectively, xA and dA). We
assume that (K1, . . . ,Kg) such that E i1 ∪ E i2 ⊆ Ki or Ki = ∅.
Note that we need that |E1|+ |E2| = `1 + `2 <
⌈M
α
⌉
in order
to have a non-zero secure file size.
H(fs) = H(fs|xE1 ,dE2) (45)
= H(fs|xE1 ,dE2)−H(fs|xE1 ,dE2 ,xK) (46)
= I(fs;xK|xE1 ,dE2)
≤ H(xK|xE1 ,dE2)
= H(xK1 , . . . ,xKg |xE11 , . . . ,xEg1 ,dE12 , . . . ,dEg2 )
≤
g∑
i=1
H(xKi |xEi1 ,dEi2), (47)
where (45) follows from the secrecy constraint, i.e.,
I(fs;xE1 ,dE2) = H(f
s) − H(fs|xE1 ,dE2) = 0, and (46)
follows by the ability of the data collector to obtain the original
data from xK. Since we get one such upper bound for each
choice of ({E i1}gi=1, {E i2}gi=1, {Ki}gi=1), we have
Ms = H(fs) ≤
g∑
i=1
H(xKi |xEi1 ,dEi2) ∀
({E i1, E i2,Ki}gi=1) ∈ X .
Now we consider two cases depending on the number of
local parities per local group: 1) single parity node per local
group (δ = 2) and 2) multiple parity nodes per local group
(δ > 2). The analysis of the first case, for single parity
node per local group, shows that the secrecy capacity of
such coding schemes degrade substantially in the presence
of an eavesdropper that can observe the data downloaded
during node repairs. The second case, multiple parity nodes
per local group, allows the node repair to be performed with
smaller repair bandwidth, which results in lower leakage to
eavesdroppers observing downloaded data. In both cases, we
use the vectors l1 = (l11, . . . , l
g
1) and l2 = (l
1
2, . . . , l
g
2) to
represent a pattern of eavesdropped nodes. In what follows,
we use µ and h as short-hand notation for
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
and
n− dmin + 1− (r + δ − 1)
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, respectively.
A. Case 1: Single local parity per local group (δ = 2)
For an LRC with single parity node per local group, a
newcomer node downloads all the data stored on other nodes
in the local group it belongs to during a node repair. Since
the data stored on each node is a function of the data stored
on any set of r nodes in the local group it belongs to, all the
information in the local group is revealed to an eavesdropper
that observes a single node repair in the local group. In
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other words, we have H(sGi |dEi2) = 0 ⇒ H(sKi |dEi2) = 0,
whenever E i2 6= ∅. We use this fact to present the following
result on the secrecy capacity of an LRC with δ = 2.
Theorem 33. The secrecy capacity of an (r, δ = 2, α, β =
α, d = r) LRC against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper is
Ms = [µr + h− (`2r + `1)]+ α, (48)
where [a]+ denotes max{a, 0}.
Proof: First, we use Lemma 32 to show that RHS of (48)
serves as an upper bound on the secrecy capacity of an LRC
with δ = 2. Consider a data collector with K1 = G1,K2 =
G2, . . . ,Kµ = Gµ,Kµ+2 = . . . = Kg = ∅,Kµ+1 ⊂ Gµ+1
such that |Kµ+1| = h; and an eavesdropper with eavesdrop-
ping pattern l2 = (1, 1, . . . , 1, 0, . . . , 0) with ones at first `2
positions and l1 = (0, . . . , 0, l`2+11 , . . . , l
g
1) with zeros in first
`2 positions. Note that the choice of data collector is the same
as that used in the proof of Theorem 29. (See Fig. 10.)
In order to complete the proof, we present a secure coding
scheme that shows tightness of the upper bound stated above
by allowing to store a [µr + h− (`2r + `1)]+ α symbols (over
Fqm ) long file fs on a locally repairable DSS without leaking
any information to an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper. Without loss of
generality we assume that µr + h− (`2r + `1) > 0.
1) Append (`2r + `1)α random symbols (independent
of file fs) over Fqm , r = (r1, . . . , r(`2r+`1)α),
with (µr + h− (`2r + `1))α symbols of file fs =
(f1, . . . , f(µr+h−(`2r+`1))α).
2) Encode these M = (µr + h)α symbols (including
both r and fs) using an [M,M, 1]qm Gabidulin code
following encoding process specified in Section II-D.
3) Encode M symbols of the Gabidulin codeword using a
dmin-optimal (r, δ = 2, α) LRC, e.g., coding scheme
proposed in [17] or the construction I presented in
Section IV-B with δ = 2.
To prove secrecy of the proposed scheme against an (`1, `2)-
eavesdropper, we use Lemma 4. It follows from Lemma 4
that the file is secured against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper if (i)
H(e) ≤ H(r) (which is trivially true as the eavesdropper ob-
serves at most (`2r+ `1)α linearly independent symbols) and
(ii) H(r|fs, e) = 0. It remains to show the latter requirement
also holds.
Given e, the eavesdropper knows the evaluations of a
linearized polynomial at |e| = (`2r+`1)α linearly independent
(over Fq) points in Fqm . This observation follows from the fact
that local code within each group is an MDS array code, which
allows us to use Lemma 23. When eavesdropper is also given
access to fs, she can remove the contribution of fs from the
known (`2r + `1)α evaluations of the linearized polynomial
f (y) =
(`2r+`1)α∑
i=1
riy
qi−1 +
(µr+h)α∑
i=(`2r+`1)α+1
fi−(`2r+`1)αy
qi−1
to obtain (`2r + `1)α evaluations e˜ of another linearized
polynomial
f˜ (y) =
(`2r+`1)α∑
i=1
riy
qi−1
at (`2r + `1)α linearly independent (over Fq) points in Fqm .
From these evaluations of f˜ (·), using Remark 8, the eaves-
dropper can decode the random symbols r, which implies that
H(r|fs, e) = 0. This completes the proof of secrecy of the
proposed coding scheme.
Remark 34. It follows from Theorem 33 that every additional
node repair that an eavesdropper is allowed to observe
reduces the secrecy capacity of locally repairable DSS with
single local parity by rα. Moreover, DSS can not secure any
data without leaking useful information to the eavesdropper
for `2 > µ.
B. Case 2: Multiple local parity nodes per local group (δ > 2)
For LRCs with δ > 2 that allow only naı¨ve node repair,
i.e., a newcomer downloads all the information from r out of
r + δ − 2 surviving nodes in its local group, we again have
H(sGi |dEi2) = 0 ⇒ H(sKi |sEi1 ,dEi2) ≤ H(sKi |dEi2) = 0,
whenever |E i2| > 0. Therefore, the characterization of the
secrecy capacity for such LRCs is similar to the previous
case, which we omit here for brevity. The main aim in the
present section is to show that using regenerating codes within
local groups (when δ > 2) can improve the secrecy capacity
of DSS against an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper. Here, we focus on
MSR-LRCs, the LRCs that give an MSR code when they are
restricted to any local group.
In the following, we assume that node repairs are performed
with a newcomer node downloading β symbols from each
of d surviving nodes it contacts in its own local group.
Moreover, we assume that local node repairs are performed
in a bandwidth efficient manner, i.e., β = αd−r+1 . Here,
we remind again that µ and h denote
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
and
n− dmin + 1− (r + δ − 1)
⌊
n−dmin+1
r+δ−1
⌋
, respectively.
Proposition 35. For an (r, δ > 2, α, β, d) MSR-LRC, the
secrecy capacity against (`1, `2)-eavesdropping model satisfies
Ms ≤
(
ρ(r − ξ − 1)− ξˆ
)
(α− θ(α, β, ξ + 1))
+
(
(µ− ρ)(r − ξ)− ξ˜
)
(α− θ(α, β, ξ))
+ (min{r, h} − ν − ν˜) (α− θ(α, β, ν)) , (49)
where ξ, ρ, and ν are positive integers such that ν ≤
min{h, ξ}, and `2 = ξµ+ ρ+ ν; and ν˜, ξˆ, and ξ˜ are positive
integers such that
ν˜ = min{(min{h, r} − ν), `1},
ξ˜ = min{(µ− ρ)(r − ξ), [`1 − ν˜]+}, (50)
ξˆ = min{ρ(r − ξ − 1), [`1 − ν˜ − ξ˜]+}. (51)
Here, θ(α, β, t) denotes the amount of information that an
eavesdropper receives from one intact node (a node not
eavesdropped) during the repair of t eavesdropped nodes in
its local group.
Proof: First, we prove the upper bound on the secrecy
capacity for an MSR-LRC as specified in (49). For an MSR-
LRC, we can apply Theorem 13 within i-th local group to
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Fig. 10: Illustration of the data collector and eavesdropped nodes considered to obtain the upper bound in (48). A configuration
of eavesdropped node is highlighted using red color. Dark red nodes and light red nodes correspond to the nodes in E2 and
E1, respectively. For the purpose of obtaining the desired upper bound, we consider the scenario with one eavesdropped node
repair (dark red colored node) in each of the first `2 local groups.
obtain
H(sKi |sEi1 ,dEi2) ≤
min{|Ki|,r}−li1−li2∑
j=1
(
α− θ (α, β, li2))
=
(
min{|Ki|, r} − li1 − li2
) (
α− θ (α, β, li2)) . (52)
Now, we consider the data collector associated with the
pattern (K1, . . . ,Kg) used in Section VI-A, i.e., K1 =
G1,K2 = G2, . . . ,Kµ = Gµ; Kµ+2 = · · · = Kg = ∅; and
Kµ+1 ⊂ Gµ+1 such that |Kµ+1| = h; and an eavesdropper
with eavesdropping pattern l2 such that l12 = · · · = lρ2 =
ξ + 1; lρ+12 = · · · = lµ2 = ξ; lµ+22 = · · · = lg2 = 0;
and lµ+12 = ν. Given this particular choice of a DC and a
pattern for download-eavesdropped nodes l2, using Lemma 32
and (52), we get an upper bound for each pattern of storage-
eavesdropped nodes l1 = (l11, . . . , l
g
1) as follows:
Ms ≤
ρ∑
i=1
(r − (li1 + ξ + 1)) (α− θ(α, β, ξ + 1))
+
µ∑
i=ρ+1
(r − (li1 + ξ)) (α− θ(α, β, ξ))
+ (min{r, h} − (lµ+11 + ν)) (α− θ(α, β, ν)) . (53)
Now, we choose a specific pattern of `1 storage-eavesdropped
nodes such that
lµ+21 = · · · = lg1 = 0,
lµ+11 = ν˜ = min{(min{h, r} − ν), `1},
µ∑
i=ρ+1
li1 = ξ˜ = min{(µ− ρ)(r − ξ), [`1 − ν˜]+},
ρ∑
i=1
li1 = ξˆ = min{ρ(r − ξ − 1), [`1 − ν˜ − ξ˜]+}. (54)
Substituting this choice of {li1}gi=1 in (53), we obtain the
bound in (49). Note that we choose the pattern for storage-
eavesdropped nodes such that E1 ⊂ K.
Remark 36. Restricting ourselves to MSR-LRCs with d =
r + δ − 2, it follows from Lemma 15 that for t ≤ 2 we have
the following.
θ (α, β, t) ≥
{
β, if t = 1
2β − α(δ−1)2 , if t = 2 (55)
Here we also note that, using the upper bound on the
secrecy capacity at the MSR point from [44], when E2 ⊂ [k]
and d = r + δ − 2, we can use the following in the upper
bound in Proposition 35.
θ (α, β, t) ≥ α−
(
1− 1
δ − 1
)t
α.
Now, we present a construction for a secure MSR-LRC with
d = r + δ − 2 against (`1, `2) eavesdropping model. We then
establish the claim of security for the construction. Since we
are interested in LRCs with efficient repair bandwidth, similar
to Section V, we restrict ourselves to (r+ δ− 1)|n case. The
encoding process of the proposed coding scheme is as follows:
• Take κ(`1, `2) = (`2 + `1)α + `2(r − 1)β i.i.d. random
symbols r that are distributed uniformly at random in
Fqm , and append file fs = (fs1 , . . . , fsM−κ(`1,`2)) of sizeM−κ(`1, `2) = (µr+min{h, r})α−κ(`1, `2) (over Fqm )
to obtain f = (r, fs) = (f1, f2, . . . , f(µr+min{h,r})α).
• Encode M = (µr + min{h, r})α symbols long f using
two stage encoding scheme of the construction for MSR-
LRCs presented in Section V-B:
1) Encode f to a codeword of an [N = grα,K =
M, D = grα − M + 1] Gabidulin code over
Fqm . (See Section II-D for encoding process of a
Gabidulin code.)
2) Partition grα symbols of the Gabidulin codeword
into g disjoint groups of size rα each. Then, apply
an (r + δ − 1, r) zigzag code (over Fq) with α =
(δ−1)r inside each local group at the second stage
of encoding process.
In the following result, we show that an LRC obtained by
the construction proposed here, by combining secrecy pre-
coding with MSR-LRC from Section V-B, is secure against
an (`1, `2)-eavesdropper.
Proposition 37. Let C be an MSR-LRC obtained from the
construction described above. Then C is secure against (`1, `2)
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eavesdropping model. In particular, if e denote observations of
any eavesdropper belonging to (`1, `2) eavesdropping model
under consideration, then we have I(fs; e) = 0.
Proof: In order to establish the secrecy claim of the
proposed scheme, we apply Lemma 4. Each node repair that an
eavesdropper observes provides her with α+(r−1)β indepen-
dent symbols. Therefore, an eavesdropper observing at most `2
node repairs can observe at most `2α+`2(r−1)β independent
symbols; combining these with `1α additional symbols ob-
tained from content stored on `1 storage-eavesdropped nodes,
the eavesdropper has at most |e| = (`1 + `2)α + `2(r − 1)β
independent symbols. This gives us that H(e) ≤ H(r) =
(`1+`2)α+`2(r−1)β, the first requirement to apply Lemma 4.
Now, we also need to show that H(e|r, fs) = 0, i.e.,
given fs in addition to e, the eavesdropper can decode the
random symbols r. The proof of this part is similar to that
in Theorem 33, and follows from Fq-linearity of linearized
polynomials (used in the first stage of encoding of the pro-
posed coding scheme which utilizes Gabidulin codes) and the
observation that in the worst case an eavesdropper observes
κ(`1, `2) = (`1 + `2)α + `2(r − 1)β linearly independent
symbols. We skip the remaining proof for brevity as it in-
volves the repetition of ideas previously used in this paper.
(Essentially, it follows that given access to fs and e, an
eavesdropper can remove the contribution of fs from e to
obtain e˜ and decode r using polynomial interpolation for a
suitable linearized polynomial.) This completes the proof of
security of the proposed coding scheme.
Combining Proposition 35 and Proposition 37, we obtain
the following result on the secrecy capacity of LRCs with
multiple local parities per local group.
Theorem 38. For an (r, δ, α, β, d) MSR-LRC with multiple
local parities per local group, the secrecy capacity against an
(`1, `2)-eavesdropper with `2r + `1 ≤ µr + min{h, r} is the
following.
Ms = (µr + min{h, r} − `2 − `1)α− `2(r − 1)β. (56)
Proof: Given the restriction that `2r + `1 ≤ µr +
min{h, r}, we have ξ = ν = ξˆ = 0, ρ = `2, and ξ˜ + ν˜ = `1
as a valid choice of various parameters in Proposition 35.
With these parameters the bound in (49) reduces to
Ms ≤ (µr + min{h, r} − `2 − `1)α− `2(r − 1)β.
Proposition 37 implies that this upper bound is achievable
using the secure MSR-LRC proposed in this paper.
VII. CONCLUSION
Distributed storage systems store data on a network of
nodes. Due to their distributed nature, these systems may
have to satisfy security and local-repairability constraints apart
from ensuring resilience against node failures. Regenerating
codes proposed for DSS address the node failure resilience
while efficiently trading off storage for repair bandwidth.
In this paper, we considered security and local-repairability
aspects of coding schemes for DSS. The eavesdropping model
analyzed in this paper belongs to the class of passive attack
models, where the eavesdroppers observe the content of the
nodes in the system. Accordingly, we considered an (`1, `2)-
eavesdropper, where the content of any `1 nodes and the
downloaded information for any `2 nodes are leaked to the
eavesdropper. With such an eavesdropping model, we first
focused on the classical setup which is resilient against single
node failure at a time (without small locality constraints).
Noting that the secrecy capacity of this setting is open at
the minimum storage regenerating point, we provided upper
bounds on the secure file size and established the secrecy ca-
pacity for any (`1, `2) with `2 ≤ 2 (whenever the eavesdropper
can observe repairs of nodes in a particular set of k nodes). Our
coding scheme achieving this bound also provides a better rate
compared to the existing schemes. Then, we shifted focus on
local-repairability constraint, and studied the general scenario
of having multiple parity nodes per local group. For this
setting, we derived a new upper bound on minimum distance
of locally repairable codes. We also presented a coding scheme
that is optimal with respect to the derived bound. Similar to
the trade-off analysis for the classical setup, we then studied
the bandwidth efficient LRCs, where we proposed a new
bound and a coding scheme which is both dmin-optimal and
repair bandwidth efficient. This bandwidth efficient locally
repairable setting is also analyzed under security constraints.
We obtained a secure file size upper bound on such codes. We
then presented secure codes achieving the file size bound, and
hence established the secrecy capacity, under special cases.
Here, we point out that another family of bandwidth efficient
LRCs (MBR-LRCs) where restriction of an LRC to each
local group is an MBR code has also been considered in
[18]. In a more recent work [45], Kamath et al. present a
different construction for MBR-LRC which is similar to the
construction for MSR-LRC presented in Section V-B. On the
similar note, following the mechanism given in [18], scalar
LRCs presented in this paper can also be used to design novel
MBR-LRCs.
We list some avenues for further research here. 1) We first
note that the novel bound on the secrecy capacity that we
establish for the minimum storage point allows for counting
part of the data downloaded as additional leakage, and hence
provide a tighter bound than the existing ones. Recently, a
new upper bound on secrecy capacity against an (`1, `2)-
eavesdropper at the MSR point is presented in [44]. The
bound follows by substituting a tighter lower bound on the
information leaked from an intact node to an eavesdropper
during repair of `2 nodes in Theorem 13 in Section III-A.
Moreover, the coding scheme described in Section III-B also
establish the tightness of the upper bound presented in [44];
as a result, settling the problem of securing data against an
(`1, `2)-eavesdropper at the MSR point when eavesdropped
node repairs are restricted to a subset of k systematic nodes.
Yet, the secrecy capacity for eavesdroppers that can observe
the parity nodes in addition to the systematic nodes remain as
an open problem. Thus, new codes or improved bounds are
of definite interest for secure MSR codes. 2) For LRCs, we
utilized MRD coding as the secrecy pre-coding, which requires
extended field sizes. Designing codes that achieve the stated
bounds with lower field sizes is an interesting problem. Also a
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construction of dmin-optimal LRC with the parameters which
are not covered by Theorem 24 still remains an open problem.
3) One can also consider cooperative (or, multiple simulta-
neous node failure) repair [46]–[48] in a DSS. Secure code
design in such a scenario is recently considered in [49]. Codes
having both cooperative and locally repairable features can be
studied. As distributed systems, storage problem may exhibit
simultaneous node failures that need to be recovered with local
connections. According to our best knowledge, this setting
has not been studied (even without security constraints). Our
ongoing efforts are on the design of coding schemes for DSS
satisfying these properties.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF LEMMA 4
Proof: The proof follows from the classical techniques
given by [7], where instead of 0-leakage, -leakage rate is
considered. (The application of this technique in DSS is first
considered in [14].) We have
I(fs; e) = H(e)−H(e|fs) (57)
(a)
≤ H(e)−H(e|fs) +H(e|fs, r) (58)
(b)
≤ H(r)− I(e; r|fs) (59)
(c)
= H(r|fs, e) (60)
(d)
= 0 (61)
where (a) follows by non-negativity of H(e|fs, r), (b) is the
condition H(e) ≤ H(r), (c) is due to H(r|fs) = H(r) as r
and fs are independent, (d) is the condition H(r|fs, e) = 0.
APPENDIX B
PROOF OF LEMMA 9
Proof: Note that
cˆj =
tα∑
i=1
gˆijf (yi),
where gˆij for i ∈ [tα] and j ∈ [nˆα] denote (i, j)-th entry of
Gˆ. Since the MDS array code is defined over Fq , we have the
following from the Fq-linearity of f (·). (See Remark 7.)
cˆj =
tα∑
i=1
gˆijf (yi) = f
(
tα∑
i=1
gˆijyi
)
. (62)
Let {j1, j2, . . . , js} be the index of s vector symbols of
codeword cˆ. Given this we define set S ⊂ [nˆα] as follows,
S = {(j1 − 1)α+ 1, . . . , j1α, . . . , (js − 1)α+ 1, . . . , jsα}
Now, it follows from (62) that the observed s vector symbols
of codeword cˆ corresponds to evaluations of f (·) at sα points
{y˜1, . . . , y˜sα} such that
(y˜1, . . . , y˜sα) =
{
tα∑
i=1
gˆijyi
}
j∈S
= (y1, . . . , ytα)GˆS , (63)
where GˆS denotes the sub matrix of Gˆ obtained from columns
of Gˆ with their indices in set S ⊂ [nˆα]. For an MDS array
code, we have that rank of matrix GˆS (over Fq) is equal to
min{|S| = sα, tα}. Using this fact along with (63) gives us
that {y˜1, . . . , y˜sα} are min{sα, tα} linearly independent (over
Fq) points in subspace spanned by {y1, . . . , ytα} ⊂ Fqm .
APPENDIX C
PROOF OF LEMMA 15
Proof: We prove the Lemma for n − k = 2, i.e., (k +
2, k)−DSS. The proof extends to higher number of parities
in straightforward manner. Consider the following encoding
matrix of the (k + 2, k) linear code employed by the DSS
G =

I 0 . . . 0 AT1 B
T
1
0 I . . . 0 AT2 B
T
2
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 . . . I ATk B
T
k
 . (64)
Assume that a newcomer node downloads S1,jxTk+1 and
S2,jx
T
k+2 from the first and the second parity nodes during the
repair process of j-th systematic node. Here S1,j = Vk+1,j
and S2,j = Vk+2,j are α2 × α matrices. In order to be
able to perform bandwidth efficient repair using interference
alignment, {S1,j}kj=1 and {S2,j}kj=1 satisfy
rank
(
S1,jAi
S2,jBi
)
=
α
2
∀i ∈ [k]\{j} (65)
and
rank
(
S1,jAj
S2,jBj
)
= α. (66)
Note that data downloaded from i-th systematic node (i 6=
j) for node repair is Vi,j [f(i−1)α+1, . . . , fiα]T . Since the repair
matrix of node i associated to node repair of j-th node is Vi,j ,
we have
Vi,j = S1,jAi = S2,jBi. (67)
Note that the above relationship is among subspaces. (We
use uppercase letters to represent both matrices and row
spaces associated with those matrices.) Using the method of
induction, we now show the main claim of Lemma 15. Note
that this proof is modification of the proof of Lemma 10 in
[50].
Base case (|A| = 1): The statement of Lemma 15 is
true for this case as we perform a bandwidth efficient node
repair, where each remaining node contributes α2 independent
symbols for a single node repair.
Inductive step: Now we assume that the statement of
Lemma 15 is true for all sets A ⊆ [k]\{i} with |A| ≤ t − 1
and prove it for all sets of indices of size t. With out loss of
generality, we prove this for A = [t]. We know from inductive
hypothesis that
dim
 ⋂
j∈[t−1]
Vi,j
 = rank
 ⋂
j∈[t−1]
Vi,j
 ≤ α
2t−1
, (68)
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Now assume that the result is false for A = [t], i.e.,
dim
⋂
j∈[t]
Vi,j
 = rank
⋂
j∈[t]
Vi,j

= rank
⋂
j∈[t]
S1,jAi

= rank
⋂
j∈[t]
S2,jBi

>
α
2t
, (69)
Since Ai and Bi are invertible, we have
rank
(⋂
j∈[t] S1,jAi
)
= rank
(⋂
j∈[t] S1,j
)
and
rank
(⋂
j∈[t] S2,jBi
)
= rank
(⋂
j∈[t] S2,j
)
. Next, consider
⋂
j∈[t]
S1,j
At =
⋂
j∈[t]
S1,jAt

⊆
 ⋂
j∈[t−1]
S1,jAt

=
⋂
j∈[t−1]
Vi,j . (70)
Here, the above equation describe the relationship among
row spaces of participating matrices. Similarly, we have the
following. ⋂
j∈[t]
S2,j
Bt ⊆ ⋂
j∈[t−1]
Vi,j . (71)
Moreover, it follows from (69) and the full-rankness of At
and Bt that
dim
⋂
j∈[t]
S1,j
At
 = dim
⋂
j∈[t]
S2,j
Bt

>
α
2t
(72)
Thus, we have two subspaces
(⋂
j∈[t] S1,j
)
At and(⋂
j∈[t] S2,j
)
Bt of dimension strictly greater than α2t (see
(72)), which are contained in the subspace
⋂
j∈[t−1] Vi,j of
dimension at most α2t−1 (see (70) and (71)). Therefore,⋂
j∈[t]
S1,j
At
⋂⋂
j∈[t]
S2,j
Bt
 6= {0}
⇒ S1,tAt
⋂
S2,tBt 6= {0}
which is in contradiction with (66). This implies that
dim
⋂
j∈[t]
Vi,j
 ≤ α
2t
. (73)
APPENDIX D
PROOF OF LEMMA 17
Proof: First, note that repair sets Yj for j ∈ [k] satisfy
|Yj | = pk−1
|Yj1 ∩ Yj2 | = pk−2, for j1 6= j2,
and in general
|Yj1 ∩ Yj2 . . . ∩ Yjt | = pk−t, for j1 6= j2 6= . . . 6= jt.
Next, we count the number of symbols stored on systematic
nodes that are revealed to an eavesdropper observing repairs of
`2 systematic nodes. Let E2 ⊂ [k] be the set of `2 nodes where
the eavesdropper observes the data downloaded during node
repair. A node participating in all `2 eavesdropped node repairs
send | ∪j∈E2 Yj | distinct symbols. From inclusion-exclusion
principle, we have
| ∪j∈E2 Yj | =
∑
j∈E2
|Yj | −
∑
j1 6=j2∈E2
|Yj1 ∩ Yj2 |
+
∑
j1 6=j2 6=j3∈E2
|Yj1 ∩ Yj2 ∩ Yj3 | . . .
= `2 · pk−1 −
(
`2
2
)
· pk−2 +
(
`2
3
)
· pk−3 . . .
=
`2∑
i=1
(−1)i−1
(
`2
i
)
pk−i
= pk − pk−`2(p− 1)`2 .
The eavesdropper observes data stored on |E1 ∩ [k]| + `2
systematic nodes. Therefore, the eavesdropper gets access to
pk(|E1 ∩ [k]|+ `2) + (k − |E1 ∩ [k]| − `2)| ∪j∈E2 Yj |
= pk(|E1 ∩ [k]|+ `2)
+ (k − |E1 ∩ [k]| − `2)(pk − pk−`2(p− 1)`2)
= kpk − pk(k − |E1 ∩ [k]| − `2)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
systematic symbols.
We now focus on the parity symbols that are observed by the
eavesdropper. The eavesdropper gains all the symbols stored
on (`1−|E1∩ [k]|) parity nodes. In addition, the eavesdropper
gets | ∪j∈E2 Yj | = pk − pk−`2(p − 1)`2 symbols from the
remaining parity nodes during node repair of `2 systematic
nodes. However, p| ∪j∈E2 Yj | of these symbols (| ∪j∈E2 Yj |
from each parity node) are function of the systematic symbols
that eavesdropper has access to. Therefore the eavesdropper
observes at most
kpk − pk(k − |E1 ∩ [k]| − `2)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
+ (`1 − |E1 ∩ [k]|)(pk − | ∪j∈E2 Yj |)
= kpk − pk(k − |E1 ∩ [k]| − `2)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
+ pk(`1 − |E1 ∩ [k]|)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
= kpk − pk(k − `1 − `2)
(
1− 1
p
)`2
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linearly independent symbols.
APPENDIX E
PROOF OF THEOREM 24
Proof: In order to prove that Cloc attains the bound
in (22), it is enough to show that any pattern of E ,
n−⌈Mα ⌉−(⌈Mrα⌉− 1) (δ−1) node erasures can be corrected
by Cloc. Towards this, we prove that any E erasures of Cloc
correspond to at most D − 1 rank erasures of the underlying
[N,M, D]qm Gabidulin code CGab, and hence can be cor-
rected by CGab. Here, we point out the the worst case erasure
pattern is when the erasures appear in the smallest possible
number of groups and the number of erasures inside a local
group is the maximum possible.
First, given n = Nα +
⌈
N
rα
⌉
(δ−1), we can rewrite E in the
following way:
E =
N
α
−
⌈M
α
⌉
+
(⌈
N
rα
⌉
−
⌈M
rα
⌉
+ 1
)
(δ − 1). (74)
Let α1, β1, γ1 be the integers such that M = α(α1r +
β1) + γ1, where 1 ≤ α1 ≤ g =
⌈
n
r+δ−1
⌉
; 0 ≤ β1 ≤ r − 1;
and 0 ≤ γ1 ≤ α− 1. We then complete the proof by treating
two cases: (r+ δ− 1)|n and (r+ δ− 1) - n in the following.
1) If (r + δ − 1)|n, then N = grα and
D − 1 = N −M = (g − α1)rα− β1α− γ1. (75)
• If γ1 = β1 = 0, then
⌈M
α
⌉
= α1r and
⌈M
rα
⌉
= α1.
In this case, (74) gives E = (g − α1)(r + δ − 1) +
(δ− 1). Therefore, in the worst case, we have (g−
α1) local groups with all of their nodes erased, and
one additional local group with δ− 1 erased nodes.
This corresponds to rα rank erasures in (g − α1)
groups of the corresponding Gabidulin codeword.
(See Lemma 23.) Since by (75), D−1 = (g−α1)rα,
this erasures can be corrected by the Gabidulin code.
• If γ1 = 0 and β1 > 0, then
⌈M
α
⌉
= α1r + β1
and
⌈M
rα
⌉
= α1 + 1. Now, it follows from (74) that
E = (g − α1 − 1)(r + δ − 1) + (r + δ − 1 − β1).
Hence, in the worst case, we have (g − α1 − 1)
local groups where all of their (r+δ−1) nodes are
erased, and one additional local group with r+ δ−
1−β1 erased nodes. From Lemma 23 and (75), there
erasures corresponds to (g−α1)rα−β1α = D− 1
rank erasures that can be corrected by the Gabidulin
code.
• If γ1 > 0, then
⌈M
α
⌉
= α1r + β1 + 1 and
⌈M
rα
⌉
=
α1 +1. We have E = (g−α1−1)(r+δ−1)+(r+
δ−1−β1−1) in this case (see (74)). Therefore, in
the worst case, there are (g − α1 − 1) local groups
with all their nodes erased, and one additional local
group with r+δ−1−β1−1 erased nodes, which by
Lemma 23 and by (75) corresponds to (g−α1)rα−
β1α−α < D−1 rank erasures that can be corrected
by the Gabidulin code.
2) If n (mod r + δ − 1) − (δ − 1) ≥ ⌈Mα ⌉ (mod r) > 0,
then, using the fact that n(mod r+δ−1)−(δ−1) ≡ β0,
we have β0 ≥ β1 > 0, N = (g − 1)rα + β0α, Nα =
(g − 1)r + β0,
⌈
N
rα
⌉
= g and
D − 1 = (g − α1 − 1)rα+ (β0 − β1)α− γ1. (76)
• If γ1 = 0, then
⌈M
α
⌉
= α1r+β1 and
⌈M
rα
⌉
= α1+1.
In this case, it follows from (74) that E = (g−α1−
1)(r+δ−1)+(β0−β1 +δ−1). Hence, in the worst
case, we have (g−α1− 1) local groups with all of
their nodes erased and one additional local group
with β0 − β1 + δ − 1 erased nodes (or β0 + δ − 1
erased nodes in the smallest group, (g − α1 − 2)
groups with all the erased nodes and one group with
r+δ−1−β1 erased nodes). This by Lemma 23 and
by (76) corresponds to (g−α1−1)rα+(β0−β1)α =
D − 1 rank erasures that can be corrected by the
Gabidulin code.
• If γ1 > 0, then
⌈
M
α
⌉
= α1r + β1 + 1 and
⌈
M
rα
⌉
=
α1 + 1. Next, using (74) we get E = (g − α1 −
1)(r + δ − 1) + (β0 − β1 − 1 + δ − 1). Therefore,
we have (g− α1 − 1) local groups with all of their
nodes erased, and one additional local group with
β0 − β1 − 1 + δ − 1 erased nodes (or β0 + δ − 1
erased nodes in the smallest group, (g − α1 − 2)
groups with all the erased nodes and one group with
r+ δ− 1− β1 − 1 erased nodes) in the worst case.
This by Lemma 23 and by (76) corresponds to (g−
α1− 1)rα+ (β0−β1)α−α < D− 1 rank erasures
that can be corrected by the Gabidulin code.
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